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RETURNS TO HUMAN CAPITAL UNDER THE COMMUNIST WAGE GRID
AND DURING THE TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY
Daniel Münich, Jan Svejnar, and Katherine Terrell*
Abstract—We estimate returns to human capital during communism and
the transition using data on 2,284 men in the Czech Republic. We show:
(a) extremely low and constant rates of return to education under the
communist wage grid and dramatic increases in transition, which do not
differ by firm ownership, (b) radical changes in returns to several fields of
study and “sheepskin effects” in both regimes, (c) identical wage-
experience profile in both regimes, (d) similar 1996 returns to human
capital obtained in communism and in transition, and (e) changes in the
interindustry wage structure. A decomposition of the variance of wages
finds individuals’ unobservable effects from communism to persist into
transition, but most of the variance is due to unobservable effects intro-
duced in the transition.
I. Introduction
During a significant part of the twentieth century, overone-third of the world’s population lived under the
communist system. A large proportion of those who were in
the labor force had their wages set according to a centrally
determined wage grid. Although the effects of the grid per
se have never been formally analyzed, there has been some
evidence that the earnings structures in centrally planned
economies were greatly compressed and that there was
decompression during the transition to a market system. In
this paper we use new microdata to (a) analyze returns to
human capital under the communist wage grid and (b)
examine how wages and returns to human capital changed
in the emerging market economy as the grid was supplanted
by free wage setting in the sector composed of newly
created private (de novo) firms and a modified wage grid in
the public sector and many privatized firms.
In analyzing the shift from the Communist wage grid, we
have selected the Czech Republic because it is an excellent
prototype of a sudden change of regimes among the leading
transition economies. In the other transition countries, such
as Poland and Hungary, central planners started losing
control well before the 1989 revolutions, and their adher-
ence to the wage grid diminished as bargaining between
firms and planners gained in importance (see, e.g., Rut-
kowski, 1994). In the Czech Republic, the system remained
intact until the very end of the communist regime, and
evidence from large firm-level data sets indicates that there
was no significant rent sharing by workers (Basu, Estrin, &
Svejnar, 1999). Moreover, whereas the Polish and Hungar-
ian economies had significant private sectors already before
the transition, the Czech economy was almost 100% state-
owned until 1990, and then it underwent one of the most
rapid and extensive privatizations in the former Soviet
bloc.1
The human capital studies carried out on the transition
economies to date have examined returns in a cross-
sectional setting, using one set of individuals at an early
point in time during transition and in some cases also
another set of individuals (sometimes from a different
survey design) at a point in time during communism.2 We
complement these studies in several ways:
(a) We estimate the determinants of wages and returns to
human capital using data on the same individuals
during a large part of the communist period and the
first 6 years of transition.
(b) We make use of the panel data to develop and assess
if some individuals had high or low wage premia
related to unobservable characteristics and whether
these premia carried over into the transition period.
In particular, we develop and apply a method decom-
posing the variance of worker-specific wages into
components due to observable determinants and un-
observable determinants in the old versus the new
regime.
(c) We use actual years of schooling as a measure of
education, rather than imputed years based on the
highest degree obtained. We use the information on
actual years of education and highest level attained
for each individual to test for the bias created by
using imputed measures of schooling and to measure
sheepskin effects (jumps in wages when degrees are
received, controlling for years of education).
(d) We test directly whether education and experience
gained in the communist and in the postcommunist
periods generate the same rate of return during the
postcommunist period.
(e) We examine the effect of firm ownership on returns
to human capital during the transition. Privatization
and the creation of new firms are key aspects of the
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transition process, and understanding their impact on
the wage structure is of great importance.
(f) We estimate changes in the structure of wages by
industry and field of study (given attained education)
to assess the impact of changes in the structure of the
economy on wages.
(g) Finally, existing studies by Krueger and Pischke
(1995), Chase (1998), and Flanagan (1998) provide
somewhat contradictory estimates of the returns to
education and experience during the communist and
postcommunist regimes in a similar context. We
provide additional evidence and ideas about how one
might reconcile the differences in the various find-
ings.3
In order to carry out our analysis, we collected data on the
work histories of 2,284 men from a stratified random sample
of households in the Czech Republic. Most of the men
worked under communism, all worked during at least part of
the 1990–1996 transition period, and many worked in De-
cember 1996, the date of our survey. Using these data, we
analyze the evolution of the returns to education and expe-
rience in various parts of the 1948–1989 communist era and
during the 1991–1996 period of transition from plan to
market. To our knowledge, no other data set provides
information on individuals for such long periods of com-
munism and transition.4
We demonstrate that the communist system used the
wage grid to set and maintain an extremely low rate of
return to education. We also show that the transition resulted
in a major increase in the rates of return to education, which
reached west European levels by 1996. Unlike Flanagan
(1998), we find this increase in all ownership categories of
firms.5 Hence, as the economy opened to world competition,
returns to education in the public sector [state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs) and public administration] and privatized
SOEs did not deviate significantly from the market-driven,
de novo firms. The data suggest that at the start of the
transition de novo firms were the market leaders in setting
wages, but that state and privatized firms adjusted their
wage grids and almost caught up with wages in the de novo
firms by 1996.
We run regressions with different specifications of the
education variable, using highest level (degree) attained
versus years of education, testing for sheepskin effects, and
estimating returns to fields of study. We find that those who
have obtained (vocational) high school and university de-
grees experienced more rapid rates of increase in their
returns than those with basic education (junior high school
or apprentices). The sheepskin effect is prevalent and is
especially detectable in transition and for higher levels of
education in both regimes. Certain fields of study have
experienced tremendous increases in their returns (e.g.,
law), while others have not gained in the new market
economy (e.g., health and education). We also show that the
earlier studies may overestimate the rate of return to edu-
cation by using years of education imputed from the highest
degree obtained rather than actual years of schooling as an
explanatory variable.
Our estimates of the effects of experience on earnings
indicate that men’s wage-experience profile was concave in
both regimes and that on average it did not change from the
communist to the transition period. This finding differs from
Chase (1998), Flanagan (1998), and to a lesser extent
Krueger and Pischke (1995), who find wage-experience
profiles becoming flatter during the new regime. When we
estimate these profiles for workers in firms with different
ownership types during the transition, we find that the de
novo firms display a steeper and more concave profile than
SOEs and public administration, hence paying a higher
return to recent entrants’ short experience than SOEs and
public administration. We also find that private firms tend to
pay higher wages than the SOEs and public administration,
ceteris paribus.
We find that education and work experience gained dur-
ing the transition do not have higher returns than education
and experience gained under communism. In fact, returns
on apprenticeship and vocational education are found to be
lower for those who obtained this education during the
transition, suggesting that the major investment in this type
of education under communism was excessive. We also
show that the interindustry wage structure changed substan-
tially as the transition unfolded between 1989 and 1996. In
particular, men working in mining and quarrying lost much
of their former wage premium, while those in trade, trans-
port and telecommunications, and light manufacturing gained
significantly. The changes are in part attributable to the de
novo firms, as they tend to pay a higher wage premium,
irrespective of a worker’s human capital, in trade, transport
and telecommunications, and other sectors of the economy.
Finally, we develop and apply a new methodology for
decomposing the variance of worker-specific wages into
components due to observable and unobservable determi-
nants in communism versus transition. We find that the
variance in wages due to unobserved effects dominates the
variance due to observable determinants. Moreover, while
over one-half of the total variance is brought about by new
unobservable characteristics introduced by the transition,
there is considerable persistence of unobservable, individual-
specific wage effects (e.g., skill premia) from communism
into the transition.
3 Krueger and Pischke (1995) deal with East Germany, and Chase (1998)
and Flanagan (1998) with the Czech Republic. Unlike Hungary and
Poland, East Germany and the Czech Republic both adhered to the wage
grid until the very end of the communist regime.
4 The corresponding study of women is in Münich, Svejnar, and Terrell
(2005). A potential weakness of the retrospective data set is recall error, as
individuals may not accurately remember their past wages. As we discuss
below, we check the magnitude and minimize the effect of this error.
5 Chase (1998) is not able to make this comparison, for he does not have
data on firm ownership.
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The paper is organized as follows: In section II we
provide a brief institutional background; in section III we
describe our data and methodology. Section IV contains our
empirical findings on returns to education under the com-
munist grid and during the transition, and in section V we
present the corresponding returns to experience. In section
VI we analyze the returns in transition to human capital
obtained under communism. The shift in interindustry wage
differentials from the communist to the transition period is
analyzed in section VII. In section VIII we present and
apply a new method for decomposing the variance of
worker-specific wages. We conclude the paper in section IX.
II. The Wage Grids
As in other centrally planned economies, after the 1948
communist takeover of Czechoslovakia, the government
introduced a wage grid in an attempt to leave little discre-
tion for managers or unions to set wages at the enterprise
level. However, some discretion remained, as managers
could award “personal evaluation bonuses” that varied
across workers with the same observable characteristics and
could represent as much as 30% of the base wage. While in
principle the trade unions and government jointly deter-
mined the grid and the level of wages within the grid, in
practice the union and government officials by and large
implemented the communist party policies as set out in the
central plan.6
In panel A of Table 1 we present the 1985 wage grid that
was used for white collar workers in the last 5 years of
communism.7 The columns represent wage levels by indus-
try. Most workers were placed in wage tariff (class) cate-
gories I–Ib, but workers in heavy and construction indus-
tries were placed in wage tariff categories II–Vb. Within
each wage tariff category, workers were placed in salary
classes 1–21 on the basis of their education, experience, and
occupation and the number of employees that they super-
vised. The grid was accompanied by a detailed handbook
that permits one to determine the relationship between
education or experience and wages.
The system underlying the grid evolved over time. For
example, the earlier grids were sector-specific (e.g., the
6 See, e.g., Windmuller (1970), Svejnar (1974a,b), Adam (1984), and
Flanagan (1998). In addition to personal evaluation bonuses, the managers
could influence total compensation and hence compete for workers by
offering various social benefits, such as subsidized housing. However,
they could not change the centrally set wage rates.
7 We could not obtain a detailed grid for blue collar workers for the mid
to late 1980s, but we believe that the experience profile was similar to that
for white collar employees. As we show in table 9 below, the interpolated
wage-experience grid estimates for blue collar workers in 1982 and white
collar workers in 1985 are quite similar. The grids that we present in figure
1 for 1954, 1979, and 1998 cover both blue and white collar workers.
TABLE 1.—WAGE GRIDS IN THE COMMUNIST AND POSTCOMMUNIST PERIODS




(a) All Industries except Those in (b) (b) Heavy Industry and Construction
I Ia Ib Bonus II IIa . . . Vb
1 1,000 — — 300 — — . . . —
2 1,100 — — 300 — — . . . —
3 1,200 — — 350 — — . . . —
4 1,300 — — 400 — — . . . —
5 1,450 — — 450 — — . . . —
6 1,600 1,750 — 500 1,700 1,850 . . . —
7 1,750 1,950 — 550 1,850 2,050 . . . —
8 1,950 2,150 2,350 600 2,050 2,250 . . . 3,100
9 2,150 2,350 2,600 650 2,250 2,450 . . . 3,400









20 6,300 — — 1,800 6,500 — . . . —
21 7,100 — — 1,900 7,200 — . . . —
B. 1998 Wage Grid for the Public Sector in the Czech Republic*
Salary
Class
Wage by years of experience
1 1–2 3–4 5–6 7–9 10–12 13–15 16–19 20–23 24–27 28–32 32
1 3,250 3,390 3,550 3,700 3,850 4,000 4,170 4,330 4,490 4,660 4,820 4,980














11 8,800 9,250 9,710 10,170 10,620 11,080 11,540 11,980 12,440 12,910 13,370 13,840
12 10,000 10,520 11,030 11,560 12,070 12,590 13,120 13,640 14,170 14,710 15,230 15,760
*See text for description.
Sources: Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (1985, 1986, 1998).
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1954 grid for agriculture and 1979 grid for forestry that we
depict in figure 1); the later ones were economy-wide.8 As
is evident from the 1985 grid in table 1, planners favored
workers in heavy industries and construction over those in
other sectors.9 Adjustments were also made for the number
of hours worked per week, and, as mentioned earlier, man-
agers could at their discretion award workers significant
bonuses.
The wage dispersion across the various categories in the
grid was modest, given that unskilled workers were the
pillar of the regime and the communist ideology dictated
that wage differentials between the skilled and unskilled be
kept small.10 Correspondingly, during the communist period
wages were compressed and the income distribution in
Czechoslovakia and the other central and east European
(CEE) countries was one of the most egalitarian in the world
(see, e.g., Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992).
Since the collapse of communism at the end of 1989,
market forces have increasingly determined wages and
employment in the de novo firms. The public sector and
most privatized SOEs, however, used modified wage grids
throughout the 1990s.11 In panel B of table 1 we present the
wage grid used in the public sector in 1998. In comparison
with its communist predecessor, this grid was substantially
simplified by eliminating the industry dimension and creat-
ing 12 experience-related categories (columns), together
with 12 salary classes (rows) based primarily on education.
Information on the grids used by the private sector during
the 1990s suggests that these grids and the accompanying
rules were similar to those in the public sector, but that wage
adjustments related to experience flattened out earlier than
those in the public sector. The question that naturally arises
is whether the rate of return on human capital under the
transition grids matched or fell short of the market return
provided by the new private firms.
III. Data and Methodology
A. Data
We use data from a retrospective questionnaire that was
administered in December 1996 to 3,157 randomly selected
households in all 76 districts of the Czech Republic. The
questionnaire first asks for the wage and other characteris-
tics of the jobs held in January 1989, the first month of the
last year of the communist regime.12 Because the “big bang”
of liberalization started in Czechoslovakia on January 1,
1991, the questionnaire traces the characteristics of all the
jobs held by the surveyed individuals between January 1991
and December 1996. As a result, we have continuous labor
market histories for each individual during the entire 1991–
1996 period. In particular, for each job we have the start
wage and average hours of work, as well as the industry and
ownership of the worker’s firm. For the individuals em-
ployed in January 1991, we have also obtained information
on wages and other characteristics at the start of the job held
in January 1991. The starting dates of the jobs held in
January 1991 span the entire 1948–1989 communist period,
and we have used data from 1955 onward, while checking
the robustness of our estimates by taking later starting
points as well.13 In particular, in order to test if our results
are sensitive to the inclusion of observations from the
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, we have reestimated our models
with subsamples that dropped observations on jobs that
started before the 1980s, 1970s, and 1960s, respectively. As
we report later, we found only negligible differences in the
various estimates. Finally, for 1991–1996 we have collected
information on each person’s household and demographic
characteristics, including changes in education.
The sample is representative of the 1996 population in its
major demographic characteristics. It yields employment
histories of 2,284 men who were employed for a minimum
of 2 weeks during the period between January 1, 1991 and
8 See Ministry of Agriculture (1952) and Ministry of Labor and Social
Affairs (1985, 1986).
9 For many years, planners favored “productive” sectors (industry, con-
struction, and agriculture) over the “unproductive” sectors (trade and
services), and wages in the productive sectors were boosted above the
others. In some years, the location of the job within the government
hierarchy (headquarters versus branch office) also mattered.
10 Discussions with officials who used to administer the wage grid
indicate that the process was taken very seriously and that administrators
from various Soviet bloc countries compared notes and experiences. In
this respect, the wage grid was an integral part of the centrally planned
system.
11 In order to understand this phenomenon, we examined the internal
wage-setting practices in hundreds of firms with diverse ownership. We
have also discussed this and other issues with representatives of employ-
ers, trade unions, and the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. Using the
large firm-level data set collected by the Trexima Corporation, we found
that as late as 1998 most state-owned and privatized firms still used
modified wage grids from the communist days. The privatized enterprises
were not required to pay according to any grid, and their adherence to it
reflected inertia in (transaction costs related to changing) their compen-
sation practices. The data and our discussions with the officials also
indicate that in the mid 1990s foreign ownership was still concentrated in
a few large companies (e.g., Skoda-Volkswagen, Tabak–Philip Morris,
Czech Telecom), which may have changed compensation practices. How-
ever, most firms privatized to domestic owners continued their old
personnel practices, usually employing personnel directors from the com-
munist era. In contrast, the de novo private firms have been found to
operate entirely outside the wage grid. Finally, government intervention in
private-sector wage setting has been minimal, although loose wage con-
trols were in effect intermittently from 1991 to 1995.
12 The January 1989 date was selected as a point in time for which
people were likely to remember their labor market characteristics, because
1989 was the year of the revolution that toppled the communist regime.
See Münich et al. (1997) for a description of the survey and sample design
as well as the descriptive statistics of the sample relative to the Labor
Force Survey data.
13 In fact, this question yields data on jobs that began as early as the
1940s: 0.3% of all the job starts reported occurred before 1951, 2.6%
occurred during 1951–1960, 5.5% during 1961–1970, 9.2% during 1971–
1980, 18.9% during 1981–1990, and 63.5% during 1991–1996. We
concluded that the very early data points went too far back in time to be
reliable and that they might be confounded with the systemic changes that
accompanied the communist takeover of 1948. As a result, we restricted
our observations on job starts to those that occurred from 1955 onward, in
as much as by 1955 the revolutionary period, nationalization, and currency
reform that followed the communist coup d’état of 1948 were over and the
centrally planned system was fully in place.
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December 31, 1996. For the “mature” communist period of
1955–1989, we use data on (a) the starting wages of 1,285
men who also held a job in January 1991 and (b) the cross
section of wages of 1,955 men who were working during
January 1989 (the first month of the last year of commu-
nism). For the transition period, we use cross-section ob-
servations on wages and job characteristics of the 1,639 men
who worked in December 1996, as well as the job start
information on 2,107 men during 1991–1996. The data
hence permit us to estimate (a) cross-sectional earnings
functions using data from ongoing jobs at one point in time
near the end of communism (January 1989) and one point in
time in mature transition (December 1996), and (b) earnings
functions using a long (1955–1996) period of job start data
under both regimes. The former estimates may be compared
with Krueger and Pischke’s (1995), Chase’s (1998), and
Flanagan’s (1998) cross-sectional estimates; the latter ones
provide a new longitudinal analysis during the communist
and transition periods.
Different types of data sets have, by the nature of their
design, different strengths and weaknesses. A weakness of
retrospective data is the possibility of recall error. In our
case, the problem is that individuals may not accurately
remember their past wages. We expect this error to be
relatively small, however, since wages set in the communist
grid were clearly defined and did not change much through
time. Moreover, the wages that we use from the distant past
are starting wages on the very last job held under commu-
nism, which we expect to be more readily recalled than
wages during an arbitrary past job. With respect to wages
during the transition period (1991–1996), we expect them to
be remembered fairly accurately, because there were few
job changes: the average individual only held 1.6 jobs
during this period.
By using the self-reported wage as a dependent variable
rather than as a regressor, we avoid the usual problem of
errors in variables with respect to the right-side variables.
Nevertheless, we check the magnitude of the recall error by
performing two tests. First, we estimate the rate of return to
education by using different starting points in the past and
find the estimates to be invariant to whether we start in the
1950s, 1960s, 1970s, or 1980s. Second, we compare our
basic estimates of rates of return to education with: (1)
Chase’s (1998) estimates based on the 1984 and 1993 Czech
household surveys, (2) Flanagan’s (1998) estimates based
on the 1988 Czech Microcensus and the 1996 Czech Survey
of Economic Expectations and Attitudes, and (3) our esti-
mates using a 1984 Czech firm-level survey. We find that
these rates of return are similar to analogously calculated
rates of return from our retrospective data.
Finally, there are two concerns related to the design of our
retrospective data set. First, the sample is not fully repre-
sentative of the communist era in that it is less likely to
include individuals who were old men during the commu-
nist regime. In particular, we include in our sample those
who were alive in 1996 and were not fully retired (i.e.,
worked at least two weeks) between 1991 and 1996. We
hence exclude men who worked under communism and
either fully retired before 1991 or died before 1996.14
Though this exclusion could be a problem if the individuals
who retired or died had systematically different (e.g., lower)
wages than others, there is no evidence that this was the
case. Second, the communist era starting wage goes back
further for individuals with long job tenure than for those
with short job tenure. To the extent that these two types of
individuals have systematically different unobserved char-
acteristics that are correlated with some of the explanatory
variables, the resulting time-varying coefficients have a
duration bias. This concern is alleviated by our finding that
parameter estimates are not affected in a material way by
whether we put the starting point of the data in the 1950s
(when the sample is arguably the least representative of the
population of starting wages), 1960s, 1970s, or 1980s (when
the sample is the most representative of starting wages for
the labor force in the 1980s).
In appendix table A1, we present the 1989 and 1996
means and standard deviations of the variables that we use
in estimating the cross-sectional earnings functions. In table
A2, we report the corresponding information for the job
start data during communism and the transition. As may be
seen from the tables, the variables display sensible values
and considerable variation both cross-sectionally and over
time. Because manufacturing was the key part of the com-
munist economy, over one-half of the men have apprentice-
ship education.
B. Estimation Strategy
In order to obtain estimates of the wage structure and
returns to human capital at the end of communism (1989)
and during the transition (1996), we first estimate the
following augmented human capital earnings function with
our 1989 and 1996 cross-sectional data:
ln Wi  0  1Ei  2Xi  3Xi
2  4Pi  Ai  εi ,
(1)
where ln Wi, the natural logarithm of the monthly earnings
of individual i, is taken to be a function of the individual’s
educational attainment (Ei), the number of years of his
potential labor market experience (Xi), a dummy variable
for whether the individual worked in Prague (Pi), and a set
of ten industry dummy variables for the industry location of
the individual’s job (Ai).15 The variables A and P control for
14 The retirement age for men was 60 years, but many retirees continued
to work full or part time.
15 The monthly nominal earnings are meant to be net of payroll and
income taxes. This is the most common way that the Czechs recall their
salary, since both of these taxes are taken out before they receive their pay.
However, about 25% of the respondents preferred to report their gross
rather than net earnings. As a result, we have included as a regressor a
dummy variable to control for this discrepancy in reporting. In addition,
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industry wage effects, compensating differentials, and ag-
glomeration effects of the central city. We have also esti-
mated the traditional Mincer equation (Mincer & Polachek,
1974) by omitting A and P from equation (1), but the
coefficients on education and experience were virtually the
same. In what follows we report estimates of equation (1).16
We limit our analysis to workers with full-time jobs. In
addition to examining all workers in 1989 and 1996, we
estimate the regression separately for workers in three
different ownership types: public administration and SOEs
(henceforth “state”), privatized enterprises, and de novo
firms.
An important stylized fact from the human capital liter-
ature is that the effect of education on wages often depends
on how the education variable E is measured. Unlike
Krueger and Pischke (1995), Chase (1998), and Flanagan
(1998), who have to impute E from the highest educational
degree completed, we are able to use and test the relative
merit of three different specifications of E: (i) the actual
self-reported number of years of education (net of grade
repetition), (ii) the highest level of attained schooling, and
(iii) a combination of (i) and (ii).17
The number of years of education specification yields an
estimate of a constant marginal rate of return on an addi-
tional year of schooling and reflects the approach advocated
by Layard and Psacharopoulos (1974). The highest level of
educational attainment by type of degree obtained allows
the rate of return to vary across types of completed educa-
tion and reflects the criticism of the assumption of a con-
stant rate of return to each year of education (Heckman,
Layne-Farrar, & Todd, 1996).18 By including both of these
variables, we are able to test between the competing spec-
ifications and see which one is better supported by the data
in the communist and transitional contexts. Moreover, be-
cause we have data on actual years of schooling reported by
the respondent,19 rather than years imputed by the research-
ers from the reported school attainment, we can test the
sheepskin hypothesis that “wages rise faster with extra years
of education when the extra year also conveys a certificate”
(Hungerford and Solon, 1987).20
As in most studies, our potential labor force experience
variable X is calculated as the individual’s age minus the
sum of the individual’s years of schooling and the basic
school enrollment age of 6 years.21 In order to provide a
good sense of the nature of the experience-earnings profile,
we use two alternative specifications of experience: the
traditional quadratic one, and a spline function that fits the
profile to three categories of years of experience.
Equation (1) enables us to compare cross-sectional esti-
mates for late communism (1989) and mature transition
(1996). For estimation covering the 1991–1996 period, we
are able to include additional variables that capture impor-
tant aspects of the transition and that are not relevant for the
communist period. In particular, using our 1996 cross-
section data, we estimate an equation that includes owner-
ship dummy variables that capture whether the individual
works in the state sector, for a privatized firm, or for a de
novo firm. Finally, because we have data on wages at the
start of jobs, we are also able to estimate continuous
changes in the returns to human capital during the commu-
nist and transition periods. In order to capture these changes
in a simple way, we extend equation (1) by estimating a
time-varying-coefficient model by interacting the education
(E) and experience (X and X2) variables with an annual time
trend , such that
k  k
t  k
 for k  1, 2, 3, (2)
where subscripts k  1, 2, and 3 denote the coefficients on
E, X, and X2, respectively, and superscript t denotes the
time-invariant and superscript  the time-varying portion of
the coefficient. We stratify the data by the pre- and post-
January 1991 periods and estimate separate equations for
the communist and transition periods, allowing intercepts to
vary across the regressions.22
It has become customary in the literature on earnings
functions to correct for coefficient bias that may be brought
about by the self-selection of a segment of nonrepresenta-
tive individuals (usually women) into the labor market.
Because labor force participation rates of both women and
men declined after the fall of communism, we tested for the
presence of a selectivity bias in our sample, but we found it
not to affect the coefficients of interest.23net earnings in some cases include benefits provided by the state, throughthe employer, for raising children. We have therefore also included a
dummy variable to control for the cases when the reported earnings
include child benefits.
16 We have also tested for the effect of marital status in equation (1) and
found it to be insignificant.
17 We would like to thank Orley Ashenfelter for suggesting the combined
specification to us.
18 Our data permit us to estimate a specification with six categorical
variables reflecting the highest degree attained: (1) junior high school
(mandatory education of 9 years), (2) apprentices in 2 year programs, (3)
apprentices in 3 year programs, (4) technical high school graduates and
apprentices in 4 year programs who received the technical high school
diploma, (5) academic high school graduates, and (6) university graduates
and above.
19 The respondents were asked not to report any years of repeated grades.
20 The sheepskin effect refers to the fact that wages may not increase
steadily with years of education within a given level of schooling but may
jump up when a degree is received (see also Heckman et al., 1996). Using
U.S. data, Hungerford and Solon (1987) find significant discrete jumps in
the return to education upon receiving a degree.
21 The shortcoming of this variable is that it includes periods during
which the individual may have been out of the labor market and acquired
less labor force experience. This of course tends to be less of a problem
in the case of men than women, who are likely to take long maternity
leaves (Mincer & Polachek, 1974; Mincer & Ofek, 1982).
22 Since the dependent variable is in nominal terms, we include annual
dummies to control for changes in prices in all the models with time-
varying coefficients. We have also tested for the validity of a model with
higher than linearly time-varying coefficients, but we have not found
strong support for this higher-order specification.
23 Paukert (1995) finds that between 1989 and 1994 labor force partic-
ipation rates of men and women (over 15 years of age) fell between 6 and
8 percentage points in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slova-
kia, and that the absolute decline was about the same for men and women
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IV. Empirical Findings on Returns to Education
We divide our discussion of the returns to education into
four parts: In section IV A we present the returns to a year
of education; in section IV B, the returns to an educational
level; in section IV C, the returns from a model that
encompasses both years and levels to test for sheepskin
effects; and in section IV D, the returns to the field of study
within each level of schooling. All estimates control for
heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) method.
A. Returns to a Year of Education
In table 2, we present our overall 1989 and 1996 cross-
sectional estimates of the rates of return to a year of
education based on equation (1).24 For comparative pur-
poses, we also report estimates from other studies in the
Czech Republic and other selected countries. Our estimates
suggest that in the last year of communism (1989), men’s
rate of return to a year of education was 2.7%, and that it
rose to 5.8% by 1996. The difference between the two
coefficients is significant at the 1% significance test level.
Our findings are in line with the cross-sectional estimates of
2.4% for 1984 and 5.2% for 1993 obtained for the Czech
Republic by Chase (1998), indicating that the return on
education was low under the communist wage grid and that
it rose substantially during the transition. Because both
studies depict a lower starting level and a more pronounced
increase in the return on education than the increase from
3.7% in 1988 to 4.5% in 1996 found by Flanagan (1998), we
have gone back to Flanagan’s data to reestimate his equa-
tions and check for possible sources of the discrepancy
between his and our results. In replicating Flanagan’s (1998)
results we noticed two important facts. First, Flanagan’s
1998 data set (Microcensus 1988) uses only data on heads
of households. This may over-represent older and more able
individuals, and hence account for the higher rate of return
on education reported by Flanagan for the communist pe-
riod. Second, Flanagan’s 1996 data set (the relatively small
Survey of Economic Expectations and Attitudes) defines
earnings as the sum of earned income and various social
security benefits. Since the contribution of social security
benefits to total income is more important for less educated
workers, the construction of this dependent variable may
explain the relatively low returns to education found in
Flanagan’s 1996 estimates.
The pattern of increased return on education is similar to
that found by cross-sectional studies in other CEE countries,
except for east Germany, in the early transition. As may be
seen from table 2, within a few years after the start of the
transition, the rates of return on a year of education in CEE
in each country. Our survey provides us with a number of variables that
can be used to impose exclusion restrictions in that they are likely to affect
the respondent’s labor force participation decision but not his wage. In
particular, we derived Heckman’s (1979)  by estimating a probit equation
with the 1996 cross-section data, using as explanatory variables a marital
status dummy, a dummy variable for the presence of children under 15
years of age in the household, the per capita household income minus the
income of the respondent, a dummy variable for Prague, the district-level
vacancy rates (the number of vacancies per working age inhabitant), and
the respondent’s age, age2, and education (in years). The estimation yields
a positive and significant , but the estimated coefficients on education
and experience remain unaffected by the correction procedure.
24 The complete set of our estimates of equation (1) using the 1989 and
1996 cross-sectional data is presented in appendix table A3.
TABLE 2.—ESTIMATED RETURNS TO A YEAR OF EDUCATION, CROSS-SECTIONAL EVIDENCE FOR THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND OTHER COUNTRIES
Country Reference Years
Communism Transition
Men Men & Women Men Men & Women
CEE:
Czech Republic (1) 1989, 1996 0.027 0.058
Czech Republic (2) 1984, 1993 0.024 0.052
Czech Republic (3) 1989, 1996 0.037 0.045
East Germany (4) 1989, 1991 0.044 0.041
East Germany (5) 1988, 1991 0.077 0.062
Poland (6) 1987, 1992 0.050 0.070
Slovakia (2) 1984, 1993 0.028 0.049
CIS:
Russia (7) 1991, 1994 0.031 0.067
Latin America:
Argentina (8) 1989 0.103
Chile (8) 1989 0.120
Mexico (8) 1984 0.141
Venezuela (8) 1989 0.084
Europe:
West Germany (8) 1987 0.049
West Germany (5) 1988 0.075 0.077
Great Britain (8) 1984 0.068
Switzerland (8) 1987 0.079
United States (4) 1989 0.085 0.093
Note: Figures are reported coefficients from human capital (Mincer, 1976) earnings functions. All coefficients are statistically significant. CEE  Central and East Europe. CIS  Commonwealth of Independent
States.
Sources: (1) Authors’ estimates, see Table A.3; (2) Chase, 1998; (3) Flanagan, 1998; (4) Bird et al., 1994; (5) Krueger and Pischke, 1995; (6) Rutkowski, 1997; (7) Brainerd, 1998; (8) Psacharopoulos, 1994.
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and Russia became similar to the rates in western Europe,
but not as high as the rates in the United States and Latin
America.
Whereas this may be the first place where the rates of
return to education for all of these transition countries are
presented together, the stylized fact drawn from table 2 is
known. What is not yet known, however, is whether the
rates of return to education vary with ownership. In the
tables that follow, we report the rates of return by three
important ownership categories: SOEs and public adminis-
tration (State), privatized firms (Privatized), and private de
novo firms (DeNovo). We are thus able to assess whether
the new private entrepreneurs deviate from the communist
era wage grid and reward human capital differently than
their privatized and nonprivatized SOE counterparts. This is
an important question in that postcommunist adjustments in
the wage grid, reductions in government subsidies to the
state sector, and the opening up of the economy to interna-
tional competition induced important changes in the pay
policies of the SOEs and privatized firms as well. Whether
the returns to human capital are higher in the de novo,
privatized, or public-sector firms depends on the relative
magnitudes of these effects.
In panels A and B of table 3, we present estimated returns
to a year of education using the cross-sectional and longi-
tudinal data, respectively. In panel A, the 1996 cross-
sectional estimates by ownership suggest that the privatized
firms provide the highest rate of return to a year of educa-
tion (6.5%), followed by the de novo firms (6.1%) and the
state (5.6%).25 However, these results—based on 384 ob-
servations for state enterprises, 504 for privatized firms, and
604 for de novo firms—are not statistically different from
one another, indicating no systematic difference in the
education-based wage differentials across principal owner-
ship forms.26
In panel B of table 3, the time-varying coefficients are
presented as the 1991 base and the annual change. The
coefficient on the annual change (interaction term) is mi-
nuscule and insignificant during the communist period,
indicating that under the communist grid the rate of return to
a year of schooling remained constant over time at a mere
1.7%. Moreover, a test of the difference between the point
estimates from the longitudinal (1955–1989) and cross-
sectional (1989) data indicates that there was no statistically
significant difference. In order to check if our estimates are
sensitive to the starting date, we have also estimated the
time-varying-coefficients model with observations going
back to the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, respectively. We find
that all three estimated coefficients on the interaction terms
are insignificant and the base coefficients on education are
in the range 0.15 to 0.21 and within 1 standard error of each
other. Our results hence suggest that wage differentials
based on education were low and stagnant under the de-
cades of central planning, a finding that has not been
documented before with microdata.
In contrast, our time-varying-coefficient estimates for
1991–1996 show that the estimated rate of return to a year
of education increased by almost 1% a year during the
transition. Privatized firms recorded the fastest rate of an-
nual increase (1.04%), followed by the state sector (0.98%)
and de novo firms (0.77%), but the differences across
ownership categories are not statistically significant. This
finding hence complements the cross-sectional estimates by
showing that the rate of return rose steadily during the
transition period and that on average firms with different
ownership remained competitive with respect to education-
based wage differentials.
25 The overall cross-sectional estimates for 1989 (2.7%) and 1996
(5.8%) are the same estimates presented in table 3.
26 The lowest P-value is 0.43 for the difference between state and
privatized firms. Flanagan (1998) found the returns to a year of education
in 1996 to be lowest in the new private firms (5.8%), highest in the
privatized firms (7.2%), and intermediate in the state section (6.2%).
However, since Flanagan does not report standard errors and relative tests
of significance for these estimates, it is not possible to know if they are
statistically different from one another or from our estimates either. We
note that in Flanagan’s data the years of education are imputed and include
both men and women, which may account for the difference between his
and our estimates. Finally, Flanagan’s and our data also reveal lower
payoffs to vocational education in the newly created private firms, but the
difference in our data is not statistically significant. Again, Flanagan
(1998) does not report formal tests for differences of coefficients, and we
hence cannot establish if the two studies yield similar or dissimilar results.
TABLE 3.—ESTIMATED RETURNS TO A YEAR OF EDUCATION
Reference Years
Communism Transition
All All State Privatized DeNovo
A. Cross-Section Data†
1989, 1996 0.0270*** 0.0580*** 0.0560*** 0.0650*** 0.0610***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010)
B. Time-Varying Coefficients‡
Annual change 	0.0004 0.0093*** 0.0098* 0.0104*** 0.0077***
(1955–1991; 1991–1996) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Base as of January 1991 0.0170 0.0220*** 0.0280** 0.0270** 0.0310**
(0.010) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
†Taken from Table A3.
‡Taken from Table A6. Based on job starts.
*, **, *** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
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B. Estimates Based on Attained Levels of Education
In panel A of table 4, we report 1989 and 1996 cross-
sectional estimates for several different levels of schooling,
relative to the mandatory junior high school. (The full set of
parameters is presented in table A4.) We use these estimates
to calculate the annual returns to a year of education within
each completed category of schooling (panel B).27 The
time-varying coefficients are presented in table 5, and the
full set of parameters is reported in table A7.
As may be seen from the first column of table 4, at the
end of the communist regime the earnings differentials
between different types of schooling were small. For exam-
ple, a university-educated man earned just about 28% more
than an otherwise identical man with a junior high school
education. Similarly, men with a vocational high school
degree earned 13% more than their counterparts with a
junior high school education. Finally, the earnings of men
with a two-year apprenticeship and junior high school were
about the same.
By 1996 the returns to higher levels of education in-
creased dramatically (column 2 of table 4). A university-
educated man earned 72% more (coefficient of 0.544) than
his counterpart with junior high school education.28 The
difference between the 1989 and 1996 coefficients on uni-
versity education is significantly different at the 0.01 con-
fidence level. We also find that the difference between 1996
and 1989 in the returns to a vocational high school educa-
tion is highly significant and that the percentage increase in
this return is the largest among all the education levels. On
the other hand, the return to an apprenticeship did not
change significantly over time.
Examining the 1996 returns in table 4 by firm ownership,
one observes that privatized firms are the only ones valuing
apprenticeship over junior high school education and that
academic high school education is significantly valued only
in the state sector. However, all firm types pay more to men
with vocational or university degrees. The estimated coef-
ficient on university education is highest in privatized firms
(0.673), followed by de novo firms (0.599) and state enter-
prises and public administration (0.476). The difference
between the university coefficients for privatized firms and
state enterprises approaches statistical significance (p-value
of 0.14), but in all other pairwise comparisons across
ownership categories, one cannot reject the hypothesis of
equality of returns. Our estimates hence indicate that firms
with different ownership display tendencies to remunerate
different types of human capital differently but, as in the
case of returns to a year of schooling, these differences are
not statistically significant.
As may be seen from panel B of table 4, in late
communism the calculated return to a year of education
was almost the same at all levels of schooling, except
possibly the university. Yet, by 1996 the return to a year
of academic or vocational high school education rose
above the return to a year of apprenticeship, thus provid-
ing support for the hypothesis of uneven returns across
educational categories. The estimates by ownership ap-
pear to amplify this finding.
27 Each of the four schooling levels below university level represents a
direct path from junior high school (the mandatory level of education).
Hence, the annual return to a year of education within these levels of
schooling relative to junior high school (rs) is calculated as the nth root of
the rate of return to the schooling level (Rs), where s represents the level
of schooling and n represents the number of years of education in each
level: rs  (Rs)1/n. However, the return to a year of university education
represents a return above either academic or vocational high school, and
hence it is calculated as ru  (Ru 	 R hs)1/n, where the bar denotes the
average value.
28 The return is calculated as exp(coefficient) 	 1; in this case
exp(0.544) 	 1  72%.
TABLE 4.—ESTIMATED RETURNS BY LEVEL OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT, CROSS-SECTION DATA†
Level
Communism (1989) Transition (1996)
All All State Privatized DeNovo
A. Level of Attainment
Apprentices (2 years) 0.063 0.094 0.129 0.114* 0.101
(0.051) (0.057) (0.121) (0.065) (0.137)
Apprentices (3 years) 0.077** 0.112** 0.097 0.156*** 0.065
(0.037) (0.049) (0.105) (0.058) (0.115)
Vocational HS (4 years) 0.127*** 0.294*** 0.323*** 0.327*** 0.249**
(0.040) (0.050) (0.105) (0.058) (0.118)
Academic HS (4 years) 0.135* 0.351*** 0.401*** 0.266 0.342
(0.081) (0.107) (0.142) (0.164) (0.309)
University 0.283*** 0.544*** 0.476*** 0.673*** 0.599***
(0.045) (0.059) (0.115) (0.072) (0.133)
B: Calculated Annual Returns within Attainment Level‡
Apprentices (2 years) 0.032 0.048 0.067 0.059 0.052
Apprentices (3 years) 0.026 0.038 0.033 0.053 0.022
Vocational HS (4 years) 0.032 0.076 0.084 0.085 0.064
Academic HS (4 years) 0.034 0.092 0.105 0.069 0.089
University 0.044 0.076 0.040 0.127 0.102
†Taken from table A4, education in levels.
‡Using the estimated coefficients  on attainment in panel A and the years of education, annual returns are computed as exp()	1.
*, **, *** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
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When we estimate the time-varying-coefficient model on
1955–1989 data, we find no change in the returns to edu-
cational attainment over time (table 5). The small differ-
ences in returns among the various levels of education are
also analogous to those based on the 1989 cross-section
data.29 The 1991–1996 estimates for all workers indicate
that during the transition the rate of return on education rose
significantly in all categories except for academic high
school. The ownership-specific, time-varying estimates
complement the cross-sectional estimates in table 4 by
showing that the increase in the rate of return on 2 year
apprenticeship has been driven by privatized firms. More-
over, whereas privatized and de novo firms provided a
significant rate of return on vocational training already in
1991, the state sector registers faster growth in this return
during 1991–1996, especially compared to de novo firms.
Finally, the return for university education was also growing
most rapidly in the state sector.
Overall, our findings from tables 4 and 5 indicate that
education-related wage differentials were small and stag-
nant under communism. Market forces have increased
wages for those with vocational high school and university
education, but the gains were nil for those with lower
education. The results based on firm ownership indicate that
university education appears to be valued by all firm types,
but most by the privatized firms and least by the state
enterprises.
C. Regressions with Years and Levels of Education
Screening theories of education suggest that diplomas
serve as a signal of higher productivity and one should
therefore expect diplomas to be rewarded in the labor
market. Various studies using U.S. data test for sheepskin
effects by estimating the difference in wages of individ-
uals with and without a diploma, conditional on years of
schooling (see, e.g., Hungerford & Solon, 1987; Card &
Krueger, 1992; and Jaeger & Page, 1996). Except for
Jaeger and Page’s (1996) study, however, the U.S. esti-
mates are based on data that do not have information on
the highest degree attained by an individual and therefore
have to impute the level attained from the usual number
of years it takes to complete a given degree. In contrast,
researchers of transition economies usually have only
information on the highest degree attained and must
impute the number of years of schooling of an individual
by using the usual number of years it takes to complete a
degree. To the extent that individuals obtain a diploma
with more or fewer years of study, estimates of sheepskin
effects in the U.S. and returns to a year of education in
the transition countries are biased. We are fortunate to
have information on both the individual’s reported years
of education (net of any repeated grades) and the highest
degree attained. We can thus obtain unbiased estimates of
the sheepskin effect and also test for the bias using
imputed versus actual years of schooling. We also show
a new way of testing for the sheepskin effect by estimat-
ing returns to years of study that lead to a degree and
those that do not.
29 The 1955–1990 results also indicate that men with academic high
school and university degrees had higher starting wages than others and
that the wages of high school and university graduates were not statisti-
cally different from each other (P-value of 0.96).
TABLE 5.—ESTIMATED RETURNS BY LEVEL OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT† (TIME-VARYING-COEFFICIENTS MODEL)
Communism
(1955–1989) Transition (1991–1996)
All All State Privatized DeNovo
Apprentice (2 years) 0.057 	0.078 0.153 0.154 	0.066
(0.101) (0.106) (0.167) (0.156) (0.164)
Apprentice (2 years)  t n.a. 0.079** 0.024 0.061* 0.062
(0.031) (0.051) (0.034) (0.062)
Apprentice (3 years) 0.069 0.049 0.095 0.118 0.087
(0.075) (0.069) (0.112) (0.103) (0.078)
Apprentice (3 years)  t 0.000 0.053** 0.065*** 0.042* 0.032**
(0.005) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.015)
Vocational HS (4 years) 0.056 0.051 0.059 0.203* 0.183**
(0.082) (0.074) (0.124) (0.117) (0.091)
Vocational HS (4 years)  t 	0.001 0.077*** 0.102*** 0.047** 0.032*
(0.006) (0.022) (0.032) (0.022) (0.019)
Academic HS (4 years) 0.338* 0.090 0.299 0.059 0.013
(0.178) (0.113) (0.186) (0.240) (0.186)
Academic HS (4 years)  t 0.010 0.033 0.037 0.104* 0.032
(0.011) (0.034) (0.056) (0.056) (0.053)
University 0.179** 0.268*** 0.330** 0.405*** 0.316***
(0.089) (0.082) (0.133) (0.127) (0.112)
University  t 	0.005 0.100*** 0.117*** 0.076*** 0.099***
(0.007) (0.025) (0.041) (0.026) (0.025)
†Taken from table A6.
*, **, *** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
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In table 6, we present the coefficients for a specification
that includes years of education (net of grade repetition) and
dummy variables for highest degree attained, estimated
from the 1989 and 1996 cross-sectional data and controlling
for the variables listed in equation (1). In both years, we find
sheepskin effects for higher levels of education—vocational
high school and university degrees in 1989, and these two
degrees plus the academic high school diploma in 1996. We
also find an overall effect associated with completing de-
grees in that we reject (at 1% in 1996 and 11% in 1989) the
hypothesis that the coefficients on the five educational
levels are jointly zero. The estimated coefficients on higher
education also become greater over time, but F-tests on
pairwise differences of the coefficients between 1989 and
1996 do not find any of them to be statistically significant.
Examining the sheepskin effect by firm ownership during
the transition, we find that the privatized and de novo firms
place more importance on diplomas than the state sector and
that the state sector is the only owner that values years of
education.30
Since many other studies, including Krueger and Pischke
(1995), Flanagan (1998), and Chase (1998), had to impute
the information on years of education from data on attain-
ment, we have taken advantage of the dual reporting in our
data and reestimated our regressions with the imputed years
of education in order to assess the magnitude of the errors-
in-variables bias of this indirect, but commonly used, mea-
sure. Normally, the imputed years of education would gen-
erate a downward bias that is associated with errors in
variables. However, in our case the imputed years of edu-
cation may generate an upward bias because the measure
underestimates the number of years of schooling for people
that study for additional years without obtaining a degree.
Indeed, the coefficient on imputed years of schooling (the
first row of table 7) is higher than the coefficient on actual
years attended (table 3) for both communism (0.033 versus
0.027) and transition (0.066 versus 0.058). The associated
standard errors are sufficiently large, however, not to permit
us to reject the hypothesis that in both periods the coeffi-
cients on imputed and reported years of education are not
statistically different from one another.31 The downward and
upward biases hence just about cancel one another out.
We also test for the sheepskin effect using data on years
of education and attained degree. In particular, we test the
hypothesis that years of education that lead to a degree have
a higher payoff than those that do not. To implement the
test, we use our information on the total number of reported
years of education and the highest degree obtained, together
with the knowledge of the usual number of years needed to
obtain a given degree. Using this information, we impute
the number of years of education used for (a) obtaining the
30 The coefficient differences between state and privatized firms and
between state and de novo firms are found to be statistically significant at




All All State Privatized DeNovo
Years of education 0.006 0.020** 0.042*** 0.002 0.000
(0.007) (0.009) (0.016) (0.013) (0.018)
Apprentices (1–2 years) 0.052 0.058 0.057 0.110 0.101
(0.054) (0.061) (0.119) (0.071) (0.142)
Apprentices (3–4 years) 0.060 0.056 0.001 0.150** 0.066
(0.043) (0.055) (0.106) (0.067) (0.129)
Vocational HS (4 years) 0.100* 0.209*** 0.176 0.318*** 0.250*
(0.052) (0.062) (0.113) (0.077) (0.143)
Academic HS (4 years) 0.108 0.271** 0.247* 0.257 0.343
(0.088) (0.112) (0.137) (0.170) (0.316)
University 0.229*** 0.367*** 0.144 0.655*** 0.601***
(0.078) (0.093) (0.155) (0.132) (0.199)
Note: The regressions also include control dummies for child benefits, taxes, and nine industries.
*, **, *** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
TABLE 7.—ESTIMATED RETURNS FOR IMPUTED YEARS AND ADDITIONAL YEARS OF SCHOOLING†
Communism (1989) Transition (1996)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Imputed years of education 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.066*** 0.065***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
An additional year of schooling above any degree† — 0.020** — 0.034***
(0.008) (0.012)
†“Imputed years” means the number of years of education imputed from the individual’s highest level of educational attainment and the usual number of years it takes to attain that level/degree. “Additional years”
means the number of years above the highest level of attainment which do not lead to a degree. All the regressions also include control dummies for child benefits, taxes, and nine industries.
*, **, *** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
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most advanced degree and (b) additional study not resulting
in a degree. In columns (2) and (4) of table 7, we show the
coefficients from a specification that enters these two mea-
sures as explanatory variables in the standard regression of
equation (1). In both 1989 and 1996 the coefficients on the
additional years of study are significantly different from 0
but smaller than the coefficients on the imputed years
leading to a degree. The F-tests indicate that the difference
in the coefficients on imputed versus additional years is
significantly different from 0 in 1996 but not in 1989.32
Overall, our results point to the presence of a sheepskin
effect, and the effect is more pronounced at higher educa-
tional levels, and during the transition than under commu-
nism. They also caution that studies that impute years of
education from educational attainment and do not control
for dropping out or for repetition overestimate the rate of
return on education.33
D. Returns to a Field of Study
Our data also permit us to estimate the returns to a field
of study for a given level of education and assess whether
there was a shift in these returns from the communist to the
market system. As we show in table A5, there is no statis-
tically significant change in the returns to the different fields
of study from 1989 to 1996 for men who only attained an
apprentice education. For men whose highest level of edu-
cation was vocational high school, most of the coefficients
on the fields of study rose between 15 and 25 percentage
points from 1989 to 1996. Men trained in business and trade
services gained relatively more over this period, as did men
in manufacturing and electrical engineering. Those trained
in law, teaching, and “other social branches” saw no change
in their returns. For the university-educated men all the
coefficients more or less doubled in size between 1989 and
1996. The high outlier is law, where returns rose by a factor
of almost 3. On the low end, the returns of those trained in
health, teaching, and “other social branches,” financed from
the state budget, did not change over time. Our data hence
reveal important shifts in the returns to fields of study. As
expected, in business and trade services education has
become more highly rewarded. Similarly, the higher rate of
return for university-educated lawyers is consistent with the
increase in demand for legal services during the process of
privatization and increased reliance on legal institutions.
V. Returns to Experience
We explore the returns to experience in the two regimes
with our cross-section and longitudinal data and with the
information provided by the wage grids. In table 8, we
present the coefficients and standard errors of the experi-
ence and experience squared terms estimated with the 1989
and 1996 cross-sectional data.34 Focusing on the first two
columns for all workers, we find the coefficients are statis-
tically significant and within the standard range. We test the
differences in these coefficients from 1989 to 1996 and find
that the experience-earnings profile did not change from
communism to the transition, peaking around 26 years in
both regimes.
On the other hand, our estimates by ownership categor-
ies (columns 3–5 of table 8) show marked differences in
experience-based wage setting across the three types of
ownership. The wage experience profile is flattest in the
state sector, more concave in privatized firms, and most
concave in de novo firms. The coefficients on the experience
terms for the de novo firms are statistically different from
those for the state and close to being statistically different
from those of privatized firms in both specifications. Men’s
wage-experience profiles begin steeper in de novo firms
than in the state sector, but they are also more concave and
have an earlier turning point. De novo firms hence pay
higher returns on a year of experience to employees with
low experience (recent entrants into the labor market) and
lower returns to men near retirement age.35
32 We have F(1,1934)  1.36, P-value 0.243 for 1989; and F(1,1610) 
5.72, P-value 0.017 for 1996.
33 The actual coefficients reported from other studies in table 2 are not
necessarily higher than ours. As mentioned earlier, Flanagan’s (1996)
estimates come from data that, by construction of the earnings variable,
produce a downward bias. The coefficients from the other studies refer to
earlier years in the 1990s when the return on education was still low.
34 These results are based on the regression where education is measured
as actual years of schooling (table A3). We also estimated experience
coefficients in a regression with education measured as level of attainment
(table A4) and found that there was no statistically significant difference
in the estimated experience-earnings profiles. The F-test statistics are F(2,
3547)  0.07 for the 1989-versus-1996 comparison based on the speci-
fication with years of education, and F(2, 3539)  0.28 for the comparison
based on the specification with levels of education. To save space, we only
report one set of experience coefficients.
35 In order to check the robustness of these findings, we have also
reestimated the three ownership-specific equations with all coefficients,
except those on education, experience, and experience squared, con-
strained to be equal. The resulting estimates are very similar to those
TABLE 8.—CROSS-SECTIONAL ESTIMATES OF RETURNS TO A YEAR OF LABOR MARKET EXPERIENCE†
Communism (1989) Transition (1996)
All All State Privatized DeNovo
Experience 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.015** 0.022*** 0.030***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004)
Experience2 	0.0004*** 	0.0004*** 	0.0003*** 	0.0004** 	0.0007***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
†Taken from Table A3, years of education.
*, **, *** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
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The similarity of the estimated wage-experience profile
under communism, in the transition economy, and in the
market economies has led us to collect data on wage grids
in a number of periods of the communist regime, as well as
the transition, and analyze them more systematically. The
search was surprisingly laborious, but we were able to
obtain various wage grids, from 1954 to 1998. The wage-
experience profiles given by these grids are presented for
1954, 1979, 1985–1989, and 1998 in figure 1A–D as the
“Tariff based profiles.” We note that we could not find grids
pertaining to the same reference group over time, and the
grids hence should not be compared longitudinally. For
example, the 1954 grid is for agricultural workers, the 1979
grid is for workers in forestry, the 1985–1989 grid is for
white collar workers, and the 1998 grid is for all workers in
SOEs, public administration, and privatized SOEs. As we
noted in section I, the method for structuring the grid also
changed over time; for example, in the earlier years it had an
industrial component, and in later years it did not. Never-
theless, the grids permit us to discern that in all years the
wage-experience profiles are piecewise linearly concave
and have a flat region in the latter part of the profile. Hence,
while ideology led the planners to impose narrow education-
related wage differentials and cap the experience-earnings
profile, they built into the grid enough wage progression in
the early years of experience to generate a Mincerian-type
concave profile.
Given the nature of all the grids, we fit the quadratic
Mincerian earnings-experience function to the data of the
five grids dating from 1954 to 1998. These coefficients are
reported in table 9 and also plotted in figure 1A–D. We see
in figure 1 that the quadratic function fits the wage grids
fairly well, and better in some years (e.g., 1998) than in
others (e.g., 1985). The goodness of fit is particularly high
in the 1998 grid because of its fine gradation of earnings
with seniority. The plots and the coefficients also show that
the slope and concavity of the wage-experience profile in
agriculture were fairly small, whereas the profile was much
steeper for all workers in 1998. We note that the coefficients
in table 9 for the 1998 wage grid are very similar to the
coefficients from our data for all workers in 1996. It hence
appears that the experience-earnings profile in the grid
became steeper over time, but since the grids in the earlier
years apply to different types of narrowly defined workers,
we cannot formally draw this conclusion. Rather, we turn to
our sample to test whether the experience-earnings profile
changed over the communist period.
The time-varying estimates of the coefficients on experi-
ence (table 10) permit us to provide the first assessment of
the extent to which the concavity of the experience-earnings
profiles changes over time within the communist and tran-
sition periods. Although the coefficients on experience in-
teracted with time are all positive and those on experience
squared interacted with time are all negative, suggesting that
the profile is becoming steeper and more concave over time,
only the coefficient on experience interacted with time for
the communist period in the specification based on educa-
tion levels (panel B) is marginally statistically significant (at
10% test level). In this latter specification, an F-test on the
joint significance of experience interacted with time and
experience squared interacted with time also indicates that
at 5% significance test level one cannot reject the hypothesis
that the slope of the profile was changing during 1955–
1989. In contrast, joint F-tests performed on the overall
estimates in panel A for 1955–1990 and panels A and B
for 1991–1996 suggest that the profile was not changing
significantly over time. Moreover, tests of equality of
experience-related coefficients between the 1955–1990 and
1991–1996 periods indicate that one cannot reject the hy-
pothesis of equality of the evolution of the experience
profile during the two periods.36 We hence conclude that the
experience-earnings profile for all workers under commu-
nism approximated the Mincerian human capital earnings
function; there is weak evidence that the profile was altered
during communism, but its evolution was not altered during
the first 6 years of the transition.
The time-varying estimates based on firm ownership
(columns 3–5 of table 10) confirm that during 1991–1996
the wage-experience profile is concave in all three types of
ownership categories and that it does not change signifi-
reported in table 8. We have also estimated spline experience-earnings
profiles, where the splines capture three 10-year experience intervals from
the start of one’s career. Although the spline functions generate similar
results to the coefficients on the quadratic experience profiles, in that they
are similar in 1989 and 1996 for all workers, they highlight a greater
decline in 1996 than in 1989 in the returns to workers with more than 30
years of experience; it is clear that it is the de novo firms that are driving
this steeper slope for the 30
 segment. As we noted in the paragraph
above, this corresponds to the greater concavity of the wage-experience
profile in the de novo firms. And as with the quadratic experience
estimates described above, the spline profile (at least for men with 30
years or less of experience) in de novo firms is clearly above that of the
privatized firms and state sector, which are very similar. Estimating spline
functions at other than 10 year intervals did not fundamentally change the
results.
36 The relevant F-statistic is F(4, 3266)  0.29 for the model based on
years of education and 0.28 for the model based on levels of educational
attainment.
TABLE 9.—PARAMETERS FROM FITTING THE WAGE GRID




1954 Agriculture 0.016 	0.0030 *
1973 Industry 0.017 	0.0004 †
1979 Forestry 0.024 	0.0004 ‡
1982 Manual workers 0.032 	0.0006 §
1985–1989 White collar 0.039 	0.0006 **
1998 SOEs, publ. admin. 0.023 	0.0003 ††
*Ministry of Agriculture (1952).
†Ministry of Industry (1973).
‡Ministry of Agriculture (1979).
§Ministry of Defense (1982).
**Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (1985, 1986).
††Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (1998).
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cantly over time. However, unlike those in table 8 (using
cross-section data), the ownership-specific estimates in ta-
ble 10 suggest that the return to experience is highest in the
state, followed by the de novo and privatized firms. The
difference between the cross-sectional and the longitudinal
estimates based on starting wages is brought about almost
entirely by a change in the coefficients of the state sector.
Unlike in de novo and privatized firms, new jobs in the state
sector have a steeper and more concave profile than existing
(cross-sectional) state jobs. The profile of the new state jobs
also peaks earlier (23 years) than that of existing jobs (26
years). We provide one insight into this phenomenon pres-
ently, but the asymmetry in compensating new versus ex-
isting workers in the state sector during the transition should
be explored in more detail in future research.
An intriguing feature of our results is the finding that
while state and privatized firms continue to rely on wage
grids, the wage structures of these two sectors and of the de
novo firms do not differ in a major way. This raises impor-
tant questions of labor market dynamics during the transi-
tion, in particular whether de novo firms are replicating the
structure of the wage grid or whether the wage grids follow
the development of the private sector. In order to provide
some insight into this issue, we have computed the average
wage in ongoing jobs in 1989, starting wages in new jobs in
the three sectors at the onset and at later points during the
transition, and average wages in ongoing jobs in the three
sectors in 1996. We find that at the start of the transition in
the early 1990s, starting wages for new jobs in the state and
privatized firms were virtually identical to the 1989 average
wage in ongoing jobs. On the other hand, in the de novo
firms the starting wage in the early 1990s (proxying also the
average wage, because this was a new sector) was about
40% higher. The starting wages in de novo firms did not
grow much between 1992 and 1996, while they grew
substantially in the state and privatized firms.37 By the end
of 1996, the average wages for the ongoing jobs in the three
sectors were very similar, with the state and privatized firms
trailing the de novo firms by only about 10%. Hence, de
novo firms established themselves in the early transition
labor market by paying considerably higher wages, but state
and privatized firms gradually adjusted the parameters of
their wage grids upward so that by 1996 they almost caught
up with wages in the de novo firms.38 Our calculations in
this area provide similar results to those obtained by Jurajda
and Terrell (2002).
Our overall results for the transition period are similar to
those of Flanagan (1998), but they differ from those of
Chase (1998) and Krueger and Pischke (1995), who find a
much flatter wage experience profile.39 Our estimates by
ownership categories and an examination of the wage grid
over time provide a possible explanation of this discrepancy.
As may be seen from table 8, the wage-experience profile is
flatter in the state and privatized enterprises than in the de
novo firms. Since Chase’s (1998) and Krueger and Pischke’s
(1995) estimates relate to an earlier phase of the transition
(1991 and 1993, respectively) when de novo firms were less
prominent, the difference in the estimated wage experience
37 The SOE wages stopped growing after 1994, whereas wages in
privatized firms started growing later and continued until 1996.
38 In the present calculations, we do not address the issue of heteroge-
neity in worker characteristics across the three sectors.
39 Chase’s (1998) coefficients on experience and experience squared are
0.014 and 	0.0003, respectively. The corresponding coefficients for
Krueger and Pischke (1995) are 0.014 and 	0.0002.
TABLE 10.—TIME-VARYING ESTIMATES OF RETURNS TO A YEAR OF LABOR MARKET EXPERIENCE
Communism
(1955–1989) Transition (1991–1996)
All All SOE Privatized DeNovo
A. Education in years†
Experience 0.0236*** 0.0285*** 0.0349*** 0.0256*** 0.0283***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006)
Experience  t 0.0007 0.0017 0.0018 0.0012 0.0012
(0.0005) (0.0014) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Experience2 	0.0005*** 	0.0006*** 	0.0008*** 	0.0006** 	0.0007***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Experience2  t 	0.000004 	0.00004 0.00003 	0.00002 0.00000
(0.00002) (0.00004) (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00004)
B. Education Levels‡
Experience 0.0244*** 0.0291*** 0.0411*** 0.0252*** 0.0303***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
Experience  t 0.0009* 0.0022 0.0026 0.0033 0.0016
(0.0005) (0.0015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Experience2 	0.0005*** 	0.0006*** 	0.0009*** 	0.0006*** 	0.0007***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Experience2  t 	0.00001 	0.00005 0.00006 	0.00006 	0.00002
(0.00002) (0.00004) (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00005)
†Taken from table A6.
‡Taken from table A7.
*, **, *** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
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profiles is likely to come from the different composition of
firm ownership in these studies.40
VI. Returns to Communist Human Capital
in the Transition
Earlier studies have hypothesized that human capital
acquired under communism is less appropriate for a market
economy and it should hence receive a lower rate of return
during the transition period than postcommunist human
capital. Some labor economists and education specialists
have also noted that apprenticeship and vocational educa-
tion in the communist economies went well beyond what is
observed in western market economies, and they expressed
doubt about the value of that particular type of education in
postcommunist labor markets. To test these hypotheses, we
have identified for each man three measures of human
capital: the number of years of education, the type of
education, and the number of years of experience obtained
under communism versus transition. We then test for dif-
ferences in the returns to pre- and postcommunist human
capital during the transition period.
In as much as 14% of the men in our 1996 sample
concluded their education during 1990–1996, we have a
sufficiently large sample to test three specifications. We
begin by entering for each man as separate regressors his
number of years of communist (old) education and his
number of years of postcommunist (new) education. The
estimated coefficients are 0.058 and 0.031 for old and new,
respectively, and at the 5% test level they are significantly
different from 0 and from each other.41 The finding that
years of postcommunist education have a lower return than
years of education obtained under communism strongly
contradicts the first of the two hypotheses. We have checked
whether the result arises because a large proportion of
school leavers in 1990–1996 have lower levels of education
(junior high school and apprentices) that we know com-
mand relatively low returns during transition, but we find
that this is not the case. In a related test, we have estimated
a model that allows the coefficient on years of education to
be different for younger (than 30 years) and older men,
proxying for two vintages of human capital that correlate
with the communist and transition periods. The resulting
estimates do not allow us to reject the hypothesis that the
education of the younger and older men generates the same
rate of return, thus again contradicting the first of the above
two hypotheses.42 We have next tested for differences in
returns to different levels of education (apprenticeships,
vocational, academic high school, and university) obtained
during versus after communism. We estimated our 1996
cross-sectional regression using as education regressors
both levels of education and levels of education interacted
with a dummy variable coded 1.0 for those who graduated
after 1991. We find that whereas communist (pre-1992)
education at all levels has positive returns, the interaction
terms on postcommunist education have statistically signif-
icant negative coefficients for apprenticeships as well as
vocational high school education (the interaction terms on
postcommunist academic high school and university have
insignificant effects). F-tests on whether for each level of
education the sum of the communist (base) and postcom-
munist (interaction) coefficients exceeds 0 reject that hy-
pothesis for apprenticeships but not other categories. These
tests hence provide support for the second of the two
aforementioned hypotheses, namely, that obtaining appren-
ticeship education during the transition does not add value
relative to the base educational category of junior high
school. They also indicate that the lower return to years of
postcommunist than to communist education that we found
above is driven by the lower returns to postcommunist
apprenticeship and vocational high school education. Over-
all, our results contradict the hypothesis that education
acquired under communism is less appropriate for a market
economy than education obtained in transition. Rather, the
findings are consistent with three other hypotheses: (i)
education obtained under communism is (at least) as appro-
priate for a market economy as education obtained in
transition, (ii) newly minted apprentices and vocational high
school graduates command lower returns in the transition
labor market than those who received this type of education
earlier, and (iii) market-oriented (productivity- and earnings-
enhancing) reforms of the educational system have pro-
ceeded slowly during the transition.43
We have also tested the hypothesis that experience ob-
tained after 1989 generates higher rates of return in the
transition than experience accumulated under communism.
This is a conjecture made by policymakers and several
authors, including Krueger and Pischke (1995) and Flana-
gan (1998). However, the cross-sectional data used in pre-
vious studies did not permit a direct test of this hypothesis,
because they do not have sufficient variation in the values of
the postcommunist experience variable. We can carry out
the test on the 1991–1996 job start data, and we find that
individually and jointly the coefficients on the pre- and
postcommunist experience and experience squared are not
40 The various data sets may also have different age compositions of
workers. In particular, depending on the number of workers that a sample
contains from different age categories, one’s estimates may reflect the
concave or more flat parts of the wage-experience profile.
41 The coefficient for communist education was 0.058 (s.e.  0.005),
and the coefficient for postcommunist education was 0.031 (s.e.  0.013).
F(1,1610)  4.65, with Prob (F)  0.03.
42 The coefficients on the education coefficient for individuals younger
than 30 and for those aged 30 or more are 0.063 and 0.059, respectively,
in 1996. The F-test indicates that the hypothesis of zero difference cannot
be rejected.
43 The educational system went through a fundamental reform of financ-
ing and governance (see Filer & Münich, 2000), and apprenticeship
education in particular was in a state of chaos during the first phase of the
transition. Under communism, apprenticeship centers were closely affili-
ated with specific SOEs that ensured the quality of the program and
recruited the graduates. This symbiotic relationship disappeared during
the privatization process, and the apprenticeship centers were transferred
first to industrial ministries and later to the Ministry of Education.
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different from one another.44 Our direct test hence suggests
that communist and transition experience command the
same rate of return during the transition.
VII. Shifts in Industry Wage Premiums
between 1989 and 1996
Students of the effects of communism on the labor mar-
kets have pointed out that the introduction of central plan-
ning altered the wage structure significantly from what it
had been under the market system (e.g., Adam, 1984). In
order to assess the extent to which the industry wage
structure changed with the shift from central planning to the
transition, we analyze industry intercepts from the 1989 and
1996 regressions in which we control for years of education
and experience. These intercepts are industry wage differ-
entials relative to agriculture, holding constant the compo-
sition of workers’ human capital characteristics.45 As in the
approach adopted by Krueger and Summers (1987), we plot
the industry intercepts (coefficients) for 1989 against those
for 1996.46 As seen in figure 2, major changes have taken
place in the structure of intersectoral wage premiums.
Rather than fitting along the positively sloped 45 degree
line, the coefficients fit more closely to a downward-sloping
line.47 Between 1989 and 1996, relative wages in finance
and in mining and quarrying have decreased, while those in
trade, transport and telecommunications, light manufactur-
ing, and “other” activities gained. The long-term stability of
the interindustry wage differentials in these countries, doc-
umented in the earlier literature, has therefore been dis-
rupted by the transition.
In order to verify the scatter diagram analysis in figure 2,
we report in table 11 the industry intercepts and tests for the
significance of their 1989-versus-1996 differences. An ex-
amination of the intercept coefficients indicates that
whereas under communism in 1989 only miners enjoyed a
significant positive wage premium relative to those in agri-
culture, by 1996 seven of the nine sectors paid a premium.
In analyzing pairwise 1989–1996 differences in the inter-
cepts, we find that five are statistically significant. Men
working in mining and quarrying indeed lost much of their
former wage premium, with the decline occurring primarily
in the privatized and de novo firms. Those in trade, trans-
port, and telecommunications, light manufacturing, and
“other” activities gained significantly, with most of the gain
brought about by higher wage premia in the de novo firms,
and in the case of transport and telecoms also the privatized
firms. However, the seemingly large decline in finance,
insurance, and real estate’s wage differentials turns out not
to be statistically significant. The interesting question is why
we do not find a growing difference in intercepts in this
expanding sector that has been hiring employees at very
high wages. Our analysis indicates that the high wages of
the employees in the finance sector reflect their relatively
high levels of human capital and their concentrated location
in the high-premium city of Prague. Finally, a more detailed
analysis of the differentials in table 11 indicates that agri-
culture, the base sector, whose share in total output and
employment shrank dramatically, lost also in terms of its
wage differential relative to the rest of the economy. Over-
all, our findings suggest that the transition process is restor-
ing some of the industry wage differentials that were atten-
uated or eliminated by central planning.
VIII. Analysis of Unobserved Effects
Unlike other studies, we observe the same individuals
before and after the regime change and can provide a
superior analysis of the variation of wages of individual
workers over time. In particular, because managers had
discretion in awarding wage premia under the communist
wage grid, it is of interest to assess if individuals who had
high or low wage premia (residuals) related to unobservable
characteristics such as skills during communism also en-
joyed these premia during the first 6 years of the transition.
Using our regression estimates, we decompose the variance
of worker-specific wages into the components due to ob-
servable determinants and those due to unobservable deter-
minants in the old versus the new regime. This gives us an
interesting insight into the persistence of unobserved com-
ponents of workers’ wages during the regime change.
A. The Model
Let observed logarithms of wages of individual i under
communism (t  1) and during the transition (t  2) be
given by
44 The F-test value on the joint significance is F(2, 2078)  1.22.
45 These coefficients are reported in full in table A3.
46 The reported pattern is very similar to the one obtained when one does
not control for workers’ human capital characteristics.
47 The nine-point scatter in fact generates a negative correlation coeffi-
cient of 	0.41.
FIGURE 2.—SCATTERPLOT OF ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS
ON INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC DUMMY VARIABLES (1989 VERSUS 1996)
1, agriculture  base (excluded); 2, mining, quarrying, and energy production and distribution; 3,
construction; 4, wholesale, retail, and private services; 5, public administration, education, health, and
army; 6, Finance, insurance, and real estate; 7, Transportation and telecommunication; 8, manufactur-
ing—machinery; 9, manufacturing—other; 10, other.
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w1i  x1i1  ε1i ,
(3)
w2i  x2i2  ε2i ,
where x1i and x2i are vectors of observed characteristics in each
regime, the ’s are vectors of corresponding coefficients,
and the ε’s reflect unobserved determinants of wages. The
unobserved individual component of a person’s wage in the
first period, ε1, may have an effect on the unobserved
component in the second period, so that
ε2i  ε1i  2i . (4)
The parameter  captures the persistence of the unobserved
individual-specific wage component across regimes, and 2
captures the unobserved component of the wage that is
introduced by the transition and is orthogonal to ε1i . Hence
x1iε1i, x2iε2i, and ε1i2i . (5)
Using equations (4) and (5), the relationship between
variances in the unobserved wage can be expressed as
Vε2i  2Vε1i  V2i ,
(6)
Covε1i,ε2i  Vε1i .
Note that repeated cross-sectional data do not allow one to
inspect the relationships in equation (6). Our panel data
permit us to do so and also to analyze the variance of a
worker-specific wage change, V(w2i 	 w1i). Substituting
from equation (4) into (3) and taking into account equation
(6) yields
Vw2i  w1i  V x2i2  2i  ε1i  x1i1  ε1i)
 V x2i2  x1i1
 ε1i  1  2i
 VB    12Vε1i  V2i ,
(7)
where B  x2i2 	 x1i1.
Equation (7) decomposes the variance of a worker-
specific wage change into three mutually exclusive compo-
nents: (i) the variance due to changes in observable worker
and job characteristics and the coefficients of those charac-
teristics, (ii) the variance due to workers’ unobserved char-
acteristics determining the wage in the first period, and (iii)
the variance due to unobserved determinants of the wage
that are introduced by the transition and are orthogonal to
unobserved determinants in the first period.
The first component in equation (7) reflects changes in
individual and job characteristics and the corresponding
payoffs. For example, a rise in returns to education contrib-
utes positively to V(B), whereas the effect of changing
labor market experience depends on where the individual is
on the concave wage-experience profile. The value of the
second component depends on the persistence of the unob-
served individual-specific effect. In the case of full persis-
tence,   1, the part played by unobserved characteristics
in the unexplained variation of wages remains unchanged
across the regimes, and regime change does not affect
unobserved wage component of a worker’s wage (e.g.,
general ability is rewarded equally under planning through
the wage premium and in the wage setting during the
TABLE 11.—CHANGES IN INDUSTRY WAGE STRUCTURE FROM 1989 TO 1996†
Communism (1989) Transition (1996)
All All Difference‡ State Privatized DeNovo
Mining and quarrying 0.251*** 0.092** 	0.159*** 0.245** 0.063 	0.079
(0.039) (0.044) (0.007) (0.099) (0.058) (0.159)
Construction 0.051 0.131*** 0.080 0.110 0.082 0.119
(0.035) (0.040) (0.134) (0.120) (0.058) (0.091)
Wholesale and retail 0.025 0.163*** 0.139** 	0.134 0.060 0.147*
trade (0.037) (0.041) (0.012) (0.138) (0.062) (0.087)
Public admin., education 0.021 0.059 0.038** 0.080 	0.190 0.0850
and health (0.035) (0.115) (0.389) (0.090) (0.219) (0.090)
Finance, Ins., and real 0.203 0.052 	0.152 0.140 0.054 	0.017
estate (0.139) (0.080) (0.345) (0.171) (0.116) (0.170)
Transport and 0.059 0.146*** 0.087* 0.096 0.122* 0.275***
telecommunications (0.036) (0.040) (0.100) (0.095) (0.062) (0.095)
Manufacturing—food, 0.017 0.092*** 0.075* 0.045 0.063 0.118
textile, (0.028) (0.033) (0.088) (0.104) (0.040) (0.086)
Manufacturing— 	0.005 0.066* 0.071 0.152 0.036 0.111
machinery (0.030) (0.037) (0.134) (0.120) (0.045) (0.093)
Not known 	0.062 0.200*** 0.262*** 	0.133 	0.021 0.520***
(0.079) (0.038) (0.001) (0.137) (0.226) (0.170)
Note: Base  agriculture.
†Source: Table A3, education in years in all except the third column where P-values are reported.
‡Difference in 1989 and 1996 coefficients. P-values from chi-squared test on differences in coefficients are in parentheses.
*, **, *** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
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transition). With no persistence,   0, the unobserved
component under communism does not translate into the
unobserved component during the transition (e.g., entrepre-
neurial skills are rewarded only by the market and did not
appear as an unobserved component in communist wages).
One can also expect negative sorting,   0, where Com-
munist Party membership is for instance rewarded by a
wage premium during communism, but is punished through
negative wage discrimination during the transition. The
value of the last term in equation (7) depends on the extent
to which new unobserved components of wages, orthogonal
to the unobserved wage component during communism, are
introduced during the transition.
Applying the decomposition in equations (6) and (7) to
our panel data, we are able to assess the extent to which
wage changes experienced by individual workers stem from
their observable characteristics versus unobservable time-
invariant and regime-specific effects.
B. The Estimating Framework
From the estimated coefficients ̂1 and ̂2, we calculate
the residuals for each individual i as
ε̂1i  w1i  x1i̂1 ,
(8)
ε̂2i  w2i  x2i̂2 .
The variances in equation (6) can be consistently estimated
as






ε̂ti2 for t  1,2 and
i  1, . . . ,N , (9)
where N is the number of individuals. The parameter  can
be obtained as an OLS coefficient in equation (4) or iden-
tically as
̂  Covε̂1i,ε̂2i/Vε̂1i . (10)
The remaining variance in equation (7) is obtained by
substituting estimates from equations (9) and (10) into (6):
V̂2i  V̂ε2i  ̂2V̂ε1i . (11)
The variances in equation (7) contribute to the overall
variance in wages as follows:
Vw1i  V x1i1  Vε1i,
(12)
Vw2i  V x2i2  Vε2i ,
and the variance in the deterministic components in equa-
tion (12) can be estimated as
V̂ x1i1  V x1i̂1 ,
(13)
V̂ x2i2  V x2i̂2 .
Finally,
V̂B  VB̂ . (14)
C. Empirical Estimates
As may be seen from figure 3, there is a positive rela-
tionship in the scatterplot of the 1989 and 1996 residuals.
The point estimate of the parameter , capturing this rela-
tionship in terms of equation (4), is 0.23 with a standard
error of 0.027.
The estimates of the variance components of observed
wages are presented in table 12. The individual cells in the
table correspond to the components in equations (6) and (7).
Rows 1989 and 1996 refer to cross-sectional variances in
those years; the row titled “Within” refers to the variance in
worker-specific wage changes. Panel A presents actual vari-
ances; panels B and C present variances as a percentage of
the overall cross-sectional variance for each year and for
1989, respectively. As may be seen throughout table 12, the
variance in wages due to unobserved effects dominates the
variance due to observable determinants. However, the
variance due to observed determinants increases both abso-
FIGURE 3.—SCATTERPLOT OF RESIDUALS FROM EQUATION (8) ESTIMATED
WITH THE 1989 VERSUS 1996 DATA
TABLE 12.—VARIANCE IN WAGES AND ITS DECOMPOSITION
V(wi) V(Xi) V(εi) V(i)
A. Variance of Wages, V(wi)
1989 0.144 0.019 0.126 —
1996 0.156 0.031 0.007 0.118
Within 0.219 0.024 0.075 0.118
B. Variance in Percent of V(wi)
1989 100 13 88 —
1996 100 20 4 76
Within 100 11 34 54
C. Variance in Percent of V(wi) in 1989
1989 100 13 88 —
1996 108 22 5 82
Within 152 17 52 82
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lutely (from 0.019 to 0.031) and in relative terms (from 13%
to 20% of total variance) from communism in 1989 to the
transition in 1996. The variation in wage changes experi-
enced by individual workers is greater than the cross-
sectional variance in both regimes (0.219  0.15 in panel
A), implying that individual workers experience substantial
wage changes. Furthermore, panel B shows that 34% of the
variance in wage changes experienced by individual work-
ers is due to unobserved characteristics determining the
wage already in 1989 (hence showing persistence over
time), and 54% is due to new transition-specific unobserved
determinants of wages that are orthogonal to those in 1989.
Finally, 11% is due to changes in observed characteristics
and their associated coefficients.
The fact that our decomposition estimates are by defini-
tion based on the sample of workers who worked in both
periods raises the issue of whether our results are biased by
excluding workers who worked in only one period. We
recognize the problem, but think that this exclusion does not
substantially change our results, for two reasons. First,
between 1989 and 1996, labor force participation of Czech
men was very high and the unemployment rate extremely
low. Second, we have estimated the cross-sectional vari-
ances including all workers in each of the two years and
found the results to be very similar to those presented in
table 12.
IX. Conclusions
We estimate and test for changes in the returns to various
kinds of human capital during the communist period and in
transition to a market system. In sum, our study finds more
changes in the returns to education than in the returns to
experience. The transition brought about a major increase in
the returns to a year of education, and the magnitude of this
increase is similar in private de novo firms, privatized
SOEs, and the state sector (SOEs and public administra-
tion). We find that those who have obtained (vocational)
high school and university degrees experienced more rapid
rates of increase in their returns than individuals with basic
education (junior high school or apprentices). The sheepskin
effect is prevalent and is especially detectable in transition
and for higher levels of education in both regimes. Certain
fields of study have experienced tremendous increases in
their return (e.g., law), while others have not gained in the
new market economy (e.g., health and education). On the
other hand, with respect to experience, our estimates indi-
cate that men’s wage-experience profile was concave in
both regimes and did not change from the communist to the
transition period. However, we find that the de novo firms
have a more concave and steeper profile than the state
sector, indicating that de novo firms pay a higher return to
new entrants than the state. Our results contradict the
hypothesis that education acquired under communism is
less appropriate for a market economy than education ob-
tained in transition, and we in fact find that newly minted
apprentices and vocational high school graduates command
lower returns in the transition labor market than those who
received this type of education earlier. Contrary to earlier
conjectures, we also cannot reject the hypothesis that expe-
rience obtained under communism is rewarded identically
to experience obtained during the transition.
Overall, our study provides two important insights into
the functioning of the communist system and the transition
economy. First, for decades the communist planners used
the wage grid to maintain extremely low education-related
wage differentials, but they also generated a significant
amount of human capital that is as highly rewarded as
postcommunist human capital in the nascent market econ-
omy. The communist system was hence able to maintain
an effective educational system while decoupling it from
education-related pecuniary rewards. Moreover, a large part
of unobservable, individual-specific wage effects (e.g., skill
premia) has carried over from communism to the market
economy. Second, except for the greater concavity of the
wage-experience profile in the de novo firms, firm owner-
ship during the transition is found to be unrelated to wage
differentials based on education and work experience.
Hence, factors such as the reduction of state subsidies, the
opening up of the economy to the world, and the possibility
of competition in the labor market are sufficient to generate
human-capital-related wage differentials that on average do
not vary with principal types of firm ownership in the
economy. The data indicate that the de novo firms estab-
lished themselves in the early transition by paying consid-
erably higher wages, but state and privatized firms gradually
adjusted their wage grids upward so that by 1996 they
almost caught up with wages in the de novo firms.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1.—MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF VARIABLES
IN CROSS-SECTIONAL DATA
1989 1996
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Log of monthly wage 8.227 (0.394) 8.961 (0.404)
Experience (years) 18.2 (11.458) 20.4 (11.992)
Experience2 463.3 (490.445) 559.8 (545.452)
Education in years 12.776 (2.519) 12.626 (2.347)
% of population with given
education:
Junior high school
(reference group) 0.057 (0.394) 0.047 (0.212)
Apprentices with 2 years 0.048 (0.213) 0.035 (0.184)
Apprentices with 3 years 0.484 (0.500) 0.503 (0.500)
Vocational HS with 4
years 0.258 (0.438) 0.274 (0.446)
Academic HS with 4
years 0.022 (0.147) 0.023 (0.149)
University 0.131 (0.338) 0.119 (0.323)
Field of highest level of
education:
Apprenticeship:
Machine control 0.028 (0.164) 0.029 (0.168)
Manuf. machinery and
metallurgy 0.199 (0.399) 0.200 (0.400)
Elect. eng., transport,
telecomm. 0.069 (0.254) 0.073 (0.260)
Chemistry, food
processing 0.016 (0.125) 0.018 (0.132)
Textile, clothing 0.007 (0.084) 0.004 (0.061)
Wood, shoe
manufacturing 0.025 (0.157) 0.031 (0.173)
Construction 0.089 (0.284) 0.089 (0.284)
Agriculture, forestry 0.040 (0.197) 0.042 (0.202)
Trade, services 0.029 (0.168) 0.022 (0.145)
Other 0.030 (0.170) 0.031 (0.173)
Academic high school 0.022 (0.147) 0.023 (0.149)
Vocational high school:
Natural sciences 0.004 (0.060) 0.002 (0.050)
Manufacturing—machinery 0.091 (0.288) 0.094 (0.292)
Electrical engineering 0.046 (0.209) 0.058 (0.235)
Construction 0.019 (0.136) 0.017 (0.130)
Other technical
branches 0.016 (0.127) 0.018 (0.135)
Agriculture 0.023 (0.149) 0.022 (0.147)
Health 0.003 (0.055) 0.006 (0.074)
Business, trade, services 0.028 (0.164) 0.027 (0.162)
Law 0.001 (0.032) 0.001 (0.035)
Teaching 0.002 (0.045) 0.002 (0.050)
Other social branches 0.005 (0.071) 0.004 (0.065)
Other 0.021 (0.142) 0.020 (0.141)
University:
Natural sciences 0.010 (0.098) 0.007 (0.082)
Manufacturing—Machinery 0.023 (0.150) 0.024 (0.153)
Electrical engineering 0.009 (0.096) 0.009 (0.096)
Construction 0.013 (0.112) 0.012 (0.107)
Other technical
branches 0.010 (0.101) 0.008 (0.089)
Agriculture 0.013 (0.115) 0.012 (0.107)
Health 0.008 (0.087) 0.008 (0.089)
Business, trade, services 0.012 (0.110) 0.009 (0.096)
Law 0.006 (0.078) 0.005 (0.070)
Teaching 0.016 (0.125) 0.015 (0.123)
Other social branches 0.005 (0.068) 0.004 (0.061)
Other 0.006 (0.078) 0.006 (0.078)
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TABLE A3.—CROSS-SECTIONAL EARNINGS FUNCTIONS, 1989 AND 1996 (EDUCATION BY YEARS)
Communism Transition
All (1) All (2) All (1) All (2) State Privatized DeNovo
Education 0.026 (0.003) 0.027 (0.005) 0.058 (0.004) 0.058 (0.005) 0.056 (0.009) 0.065 (0.007) 0.061 (0.010)
Experience 0.022 (0.003) 0.021 (0.003) 0.020 (0.005) 0.021 (0.005) 0.015 (0.006) 0.022 (0.007) 0.030 (0.004)
Experience2 	0.0005 (0.0001) 	0.0004 (0.0001) 	0.0004 (0.0001) 	0.0004 (0.0001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 	0.00 (0.000)
Prague — 0.015 (0.027) — 0.120 (0.032) 0.151 (0.047) 0.088 (0.064) 0.17 (0.057)
Child benefits included — 0.061 (0.022) — 0.064 (0.026) 0.051 (0.042) 0.112 (0.052) 0.054 (0.045)
Gross earinings — 0.122 (0.020) — 0.069 (0.022) 0.082 (0.041) 0.045 (0.031) 0.09 (0.040)
Industry:
Mining and quarrying — 0.251 (0.039) — 0.092 (0.044) 0.245 (0.099) 0.063 (0.058) 	0.07 (0.159)
Construction — 0.051 (0.035) — 0.131 (0.040) 0.110 (0.120) 0.082 (0.058) 0.11 (0.091)
Wholesale and retail Trade — 0.025 (0.037) — 0.163 (0.041) 	0.134 (0.138) 0.060 (0.062) 0.14 (0.087)
Public admin., education,
and Health — 0.021 (0.035) — 0.059 (0.115) 0.080 (0.090) 	0.190 (0.219) 0.08 (0.090)
Finance, ins., and real estate — 0.203 (0.139) — 0.052 (0.080) 0.140 (0.171) 0.054 (0.116) 	0.01 (0.170)
Transport and
Telecommunications — 0.059 (0.036) — 0.146 (0.040) 0.096 (0.095) 0.122 (0.062) 0.27 (0.095)
Manufacturing—food,
textile — 0.017 (0.028) — 0.092 (0.033) 0.045 (0.104) 0.063 (0.040) 0.11 (0.086)
Manufacturing—
machinery — 	0.005 (0.030) — 0.066 (0.037) 0.152 (0.120) 0.036 (0.045) 0.11 (0.093)
Not known — 	0.062 (0.079) — 0.200 (0.038) 	0.133 (0.137) 	0.021 (0.226) 0.52 (0.170)
Constant 7.704 (0.050) 7.620 (0.055) 8.060 (0.063) 7.916 (0.071) 7.919 (0.143) 7.812 (0.099) 7.84 (0.157)
Adj. R2 0.069 0.118 0.162 0.190 0.256 0.23 0.23
No. of obs. 1955 1951 1639 1627 384 504 604
Base  people working outside Prague, whose earnings are net of tax and child benefits, and who work in agriculture. Standard error in parentheses.
TABLE A1.—(CONTINUED)
1989 1996
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Other variables:
Prague 0.106 (0.307) 0.116 (0.320)
Child benefits included 0.197 (0.398) 0.110 (0.313)
Gross earnings reported 0.247 (0.431) 0.226 (0.418)
Industry:
Mining and quarrying 0.088 (0.283) 0.074 (0.261)
Construction 0.116 (0.320) 0.122 (0.327)
Wholesale retail 0.099 (0.299) 0.138 (0.345)
Broad public 0.127 (0.333) 0.136 (0.343)
Finance, insurance,
renting, and Real
Estate 0.005 (0.068) 0.015 (0.121)
Transport,
telecommunications 0.082 (0.274) 0.082 (0.274)
Manufacturing—food,
textile 0.241 (0.428) 0.252 (0.434)




 not known 0.010 (0.101) 0.009 (0.096)
Firm sizes
1–25 employees 0.258 (0.438)
26–100 employees 0.211 (0.408)
101–500 employees 0.238 (0.426)
500 employees 0.256 (0.437)





De novo private 0.371 (0.483)






 not known 0.008 (0.089)
Log of district-level
enemployment rate 0.035 (0.021)
No. of obs. 1951 1627
TABLE A2.—MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF VARIABLES
FOR START DATE DATA
Communism Transition
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Log of earnings 8.049 (0.549) 8.509 (0.484)
Experience 7.009 (9.178) 13.442 (12.653)
Exper.  time 	640 (1184.843) 381 (534.646)
Experience2 135 (302.504) 341 (511.855)
Exper.2 time 	921 (2053.821) 786 (1598.660)
Years of education 12.843 (2.526) 12.428 (2.261)
Education  time 	151 (126.817) 32 (23.523)
Apprentice (2 years) 0.037 (0.190) 0.036 (0.185)
Apprentice (2)  time 0.088 (0.572)
Apprentice (3 years) 0.475 (0.500) 0.533 (0.499)
Apprentice (3)  time 	5.4 (8.482) 1.4 (1.836)
Vocational HS 0.268 (0.443) 0.243 (0.429)
Vocational HS  time 	3.3 (7.300) 0.6 (1.442)
Academic HS 0.022 (0.146) 0.036 (0.185)
Academic HS  time 	0.3 (2.501) 0.1 (0.671)
University 0.143 (0.350) 0.101 (0.302)
University  time 	1.4 (5.016) 0.2 (0.896)
Prague 0.111 (0.314) 0.121 (0.327)
Child ben. incl. 0.136 (0.343) 0.089 (0.284)
Gross earnings 0.258 (0.437) 0.226 (0.418)
Machine control 0.093 (0.290) 0.049 (0.216)
Elect. eng., trans., telecomm. 0.098 (0.298) 0.175 (0.380)
Chemistry, food processing 0.096 (0.295) 0.187 (0.390)
Textiles, clothing 0.125 (0.331) 0.112 (0.315)
Wood, shoe manuf. 0.007 (0.083) 0.012 (0.108)
Construction 0.075 (0.264) 0.062 (0.241)
Agriculture, forestry 0.244 (0.429) 0.254 (0.435)
Trade, services 0.134 (0.341) 0.080 (0.272)
Other 0.007 (0.083) 0.008 (0.089)
1–25 employees 0.336 (0.472)
26–100 employees 0.245 (0.430)
101–500 employees 0.209 (0.407)
500 employees 0.172 (0.377)
Not known 0.038 (0.192)
Privatized 0.196 (0.397)
SOE & public admin. 0.229 (0.420)
De novo private 0.495 (0.500)





 not known 0.010 (0.102)
No. of obs. 1285 2107
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TABLE A4.—CROSS-SECTIONAL EARNINGS FUNCTIONS, 1989 AND 1996 (EDUCATION BY LEVELS)
Communism Transition
(1) (2) (1) (2) State Privatized DeNovo
Apprentice (2 years) 0.0701 (0.052) 0.0635 (0.051) 0.1128 (0.058) 0.0939 (0.057) 0.1290 (0.121) 0.1143 (0.065) 0.100 (0.137)
Apprentice (3 years) 0.0923 (0.038) 0.0773 (0.037) 0.1434 (0.049) 0.1122 (0.049) 0.0968 (0.105) 0.1559 (0.058) 0.065 (0.115)
Vocational HS 0.1374 (0.040) 0.1265 (0.040) 0.3228 (0.050) 0.2943 (0.050) 0.3232 (0.105) 0.3266 (0.058) 0.249 (0.118)
Academic HS 0.1525 (0.080) 0.1346 (0.081) 0.3822 (0.102) 0.3508 (0.107) 0.4011 (0.142) 0.2656 (0.164) 0.342 (0.309)
University 0.2793 (0.044) 0.2826 (0.045) 0.5515 (0.058) 0.5439 (0.059) 0.4758 (0.115) 0.6734 (0.072) 0.599 (0.133)
Experience 0.0220 (0.003) 0.0210 (0.003) 0.0240 (0.005) 0.0240 (0.005) 0.0210 (0.006) 0.0270 (0.007) 0.0300 (0.004)
Experience2 	0.0005 (0.0001) 	0.0005 (0.0001) 	0.0005 (0.0001) 	0.0005 (0.0001) 	0.0004 (0.0001) 	0.0005 (0.0002) 	0.0008 (0.0001)
Prague — 0.009 (0.027) — 0.102 (0.032) 0.142 (0.047) 0.045 (0.061) 0.140 (0.055)
Child benefits included — 0.065 (0.021) — 0.076 (0.026) 0.056 (0.042) 0.122 (0.051) 0.07 (0.044)
Gross earnings — 0.125 (0.020) — 0.080 (0.021) 0.088 (0.041) 0.050 (0.031) 0.10 (0.038)
Sector:
Mining and quarrying — 0.250 (0.039) — 0.095 (0.043) 0.271 (0.089) 0.063 (0.058) 	0.04 (0.150)
Construction — 0.053 (0.035) — 0.145 (0.040) 0.150 (0.114) 0.096 (0.060) 0.14 (0.091)
Wholesale and retail trade — 0.020 (0.036) — 0.150 (0.040) 	0.067 (0.120) 0.028 (0.058) 0.13 (0.086)
Public admin., education,
and health — 0.012 (0.035) — 0.034 (0.038) 0.095 (0.080) 	0.039 (0.210) 0.06 (0.102)
Finance, ins. & real estate — 0.210 (0.131) — 0.024 (0.076) 0.091 (0.157) 0.046 (0.119) 	0.06 (0.185)
Transport and
telecommunications — 0.057 (0.036) — 0.149 (0.039) 0.115 (0.087) 0.144 (0.057) 0.30 (0.094)
Manufacturing—food,
textile — 0.018 (0.028) — 0.092 (0.032) 0.077 (0.097) 0.063 (0.039) 0.13 (0.085)
Manufacturing—
machinery — 	0.010 (0.030) — 0.066 (0.036) 0.172 (0.116) 0.026 (0.044) 0.13 (0.091)
Not known — 	0.064 (0.082) — 0.180 (0.111) 	0.167 (0.094) 	0.016 (0.223) 0.52 (0.176)
Constant 7.910 (0.043) 7.847 (0.046) 8.516 (0.054) 8.404 (0.059) 8.331 (0.136) 8.324 (0.077) 8.40 (0.143)
R2 0.070 0.120 0.181 0.210 0.280 0.270 0.270
No. of obs. 1955 1951 1639 1627 384 504 604
Base  junior high school graduates working outside Prague in agriculture, whose earnings are net of tax and child benefits. Standard errors in parentheses.
TABLE A5.—CROSS-SECTIONAL EARNINGS FUNCTIONS, 1989 AND 1996 (EDUCATION BY LEVELS AND FIELD OF STUDY)
1989 1996 1989 1996
Apprenticeship fields of
study:
Machine control 0.123 (0.053) 0.084 (0.062)
Manuf. machinery and
metallurgy 0.113 (0.040) 0.139 (0.051)
Elec. eng., transport,
telecomm. 0.076 (0.045) 0.122 (0.056)
Chemistry, food processing 0.122 (0.068) 0.031 (0.085)
Textile, clothing 	0.056 (0.071) 	0.194 (0.133)
Wood, shoe manufacturing 0.071 (0.056) 0.073 (0.061)
Construction 0.054 (0.046) 0.154 (0.060)
Agriculture, forestry 	0.040 (0.053) 	0.007 (0.064)
Trade, services 0.007 (0.067) 0.161 (0.071)
Other 0.093 (0.061) 0.163 (0.067)
Academic high school 0.138 (0.081) 0.352 (0.106)
Fields within vocational high
school:
Natural sciences 0.185 (0.127) 0.745 (0.303)
Manufacturing—machinery 0.120 (0.045) 0.289 (0.052)
Electrical engineering 0.120 (0.052) 0.361 (0.058)
Construction 0.138 (0.077) 0.309 (0.079)
Other technical branches 0.238 (0.070) 0.265 (0.073)
Agriculture 0.011 (0.065) 0.163 (0.063)
Health 	0.011 (0.118) 0.084 (0.129)
Business, trade, services 0.099 (0.068) 0.280 (0.069)
Law 0.539 (0.348) 0.617 (0.119)
Teaching 0.215 (0.172) 0.223 (0.154)
Other social branches 0.198 (0.101) 0.240 (0.198)
Other 0.210 (0.071) 0.354 (0.082)
Fields within university
education:
Natural sciences 0.135 (0.106) 0.454 (0.157)
Manufacturing—machinery 0.274 (0.074) 0.571 (0.082)
Electrical engineering 0.300 (0.069) 0.746 (0.130)
Construction 0.275 (0.076) 0.569 (0.104)
Base  junior high school graduates working outside Prague in agriculture, earnings net of tax and child benefits. Standard errors in parentheses.
Fields within university
education: (cont’d)
Other technical branches 0.488 (0.079) 0.753 (0.136)
Agriculture 0.305 (0.077) 0.496 (0.080)
Health 0.315 (0.091) 0.246 (0.166)
Business, trade, services 0.350 (0.117) 0.643 (0.144)
Law 0.394 (0.112) 1.054 (0.138)
Teaching 0.266 (0.083) 0.314 (0.091)
Other social branches 0.129 (0.087) 0.139 (0.101)
Other 	0.007 (0.129) 0.548 (0.088)
Experience 0.021 (0.003) 0.025 (0.0049)
Experience2 	(0.00044) (0.00006) 	(0.00052) (0.0001)
Prague 0.008 (0.028) 0.108 (0.031)
Child benefits 0.063 (0.021) 0.081 (0.026)
Gross earnings 0.130 (0.020) 0.085 (0.021)
Industry:
Mining and quarrying 0.214 (0.040) 0.046 (0.045)
Construction 0.027 (0.039) 0.086 (0.045)
Wholesale and retail trade 	0.005 (0.037) 0.098 (0.041)
Finance, ins. and real
estate 0.167 (0.132) 	0.014 (0.077)
Transport and
Telecommunications 0.019 (0.037) 0.097 (0.042)
Manufacturing—food,
textile 	0.021 (0.029) 0.046 (0.034)
Manufacturing—machinery 	0.051 (0.033) 0.013 (0.039)
Public admin., education
and health 	0.015 (0.038) 0.017 (0.041)
Not known 	0.089 (0.082) 0.135 (0.112)
Constant term 7.877 (0.046) 8.431 (0.060)
Adj. R2 0.129 0.240
No. of obs. 1951 1627
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TABLE A6.—EARNINGS REGRESSIONS WITH TIME-VARYING COFFICIENTS FOR COMMUNISM AND TRANSITION (EDUCATION IN YEARS)
Communism
Transition
All State Privatized DeNovo
Education 0.0166 (0.0099) 0.0219 (0.0072) 0.0276 (0.0118) 0.0273 (0.0121) 0.0308 (0.0123)
Education  t 	0.0003 (0.0007) 0.0093 (0.0020) 0.0098 (0.0050) 0.0104 (0.0039) 0.0077 (0.0030)
Experience 0.0236 (0.0053) 0.0285 (0.0053) 0.0349 (0.0066) 0.0256 (0.0086) 0.0283 (0.0060)
Experience  t 0.0007 (0.0005) 0.0017 (0.0014) 0.0018 (0.0030) 0.0012 (0.0026) 0.0012 (0.0018)
Experience2 	0.0005 (0.0002) 	0.0006 (0.0001) 0.0008 (0.0001) 0.0006 (0.0002) 0.0007 (0.0001)
Experience2  t 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0001) 0.0000 (0.0001) 0.0000 (0.0000)
Prague 	0.1257 (0.0460) 0.1506 (0.0279) 0.1911 (0.0561) 0.1111 (0.0651) 0.1856 (0.0369)
Child benefits included 0.2282 (0.0403) 0.1194 (0.0296) 0.1817 (0.0616) 0.0512 (0.0653) 0.1136 (0.0392)
Gross earnings 0.1328 (0.0514) 0.0420 (0.0441) 0.0863 (0.0944) 0.1133 (0.0780) 0.0360 (0.0613)
Gross earnings  t 0.0899 (0.1601) 0.0176 (0.0131) 0.0628 (0.0326) 0.0302 (0.0259) 0.0216 (0.0176)
Industry:
Mining and quarrying 0.2759 (0.0553) 0.0448 (0.0548) 0.1965 (0.1287) 0.0382 (0.0792) 0.2002 (0.1094)
Construction 0.1337 (0.0520) 0.1287 (0.0430) 	0.0241 (0.1255) 0.1627 (0.0707) 0.0249 (0.0578)
Wholesale and retail trade 	0.0540 (0.0589) 0.1186 (0.0447) — 0.1844 (0.0945) 0.0110 (0.0593)
Public admin., education, and Health 0.0937 (0.0513) 0.0650 (0.0470) 0.1244 (0.1310) — —
Finance, insurance, and real estate 0.1161 (0.2079) 0.0047 (0.0818) 0.1294 (0.1142) 0.0406 (0.1378) 0.0489 (0.0746)
Transport & telecommunications 0.0963 (0.0632) 0.1010 (0.0551) 0.2232 (0.1959) 0.0060 (0.1032) 0.1819 (0.1379)
Manufacturing—food, textile 	0.0021 (0.0441) 0.0253 (0.0414) 0.1072 (0.1204) 0.1721 (0.1008) 0.0753 (0.0856)
Manufacturing—machinery 	0.0162 (0.0494) 0.0855 (0.0482) 0.0018 (0.1171) 0.0086 (0.0634) 0.0079 (0.0569)
Not known 0.0639 (0.1303) 0.1963 (0.1032) 0.0351 (0.1379) 0.0778 (0.1119) 0.1842 (0.1578)
Constant 7.9297 (0.1289) 7.7520 (0.0944) 7.5578 (0.1799) 7.6788 (0.1553) 7.8586 (0.1707)
Adj R2 0.172 0.285 0.384 0.269 0.356
No. of obs. 1285 2107 483 1045 579
Base  individuals working outside Prague in agriculture, whose earnings are net of tax and child benefits. Standard errors in parentheses.
TABLE A7.—EARNINGS REGRESSIONS WITH TIME-VARYING COFFICIENTS FOR COMMUNISM AND TRANSITION (EDUCATION IN LEVELS)
Communism
Transition
All State Privatized DeNovo
Apprentice (2 years) 0.0566 (0.1007) 0.0783 (0.1062) 0.1532 (0.1673) 0.1542 (0.1562) 	0.0658 (0.1635)
Apprentice (2 years)  t n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Apprentice (3 years) 0.0690 (0.0745) 0.0489 (0.0691) 0.0950 (0.1117) 0.1185 (0.1032) 0.0865 (0.0775)
Apprentice (3 years)  t 	0.0003 (0.0051) 0.0528 (0.0206) 0.0652 (0.0217) 0.0417 (0.0216) 0.0315 (0.0150)
Vocational HS 0.056 (0.082) 0.051 (0.074) 0.0591 (0.1243) 0.2034 (0.1169) 0.1827 (0.0911)
Vocational HS  t 	0.0014 (0.0059) 0.0768 (0.022) 0.1022 (0.0323) 0.0474 (0.0217) 0.0322 (0.0191)
Academic HS 0.3378 (0.1783) 0.0896 (0.1126) 0.2993 (0.1857) 0.0585 (0.2400) 0.0133 (0.1862)
Academic HS  t 0.0104 (0.0106) 0.0335 (0.0338) 0.0367 (0.0560) 0.1037 (0.0559) 0.0315 (0.0535)
University 0.1789 (0.0888) 0.2675 (0.0822) 0.3302 (0.1332) 0.4048 (0.1270) 0.3160 (0.1120)
University  t 	0.0047 (0.0066) 0.0996 (0.0245) 0.1168 (0.0409) 0.0762 (0.0263) 0.0987 (0.0253)
Experience 0.0244 (0.0054) 0.0291 (0.0053) 0.0411 (0.0063) 0.0252 (0.0077) 0.0303 (0.0057)
Experience  t 0.0009 (0.00048) 0.0002 (0.0001) 0.0026 (0.0027) 0.0033 (0.0025) 0.0016 (0.0018)
Experience2 	0.0006 (0.0002) 	0.0006 (0.0001) 0.0009 (0.0001) 0.0006 (0.0002) 	0.0007 (0.0001)
Experience2  t 	0.00001 (0.00002) 	0.000004 (0.000003) 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0000 (0.0000)
Prague 	0.130 (0.046) 0.140 (0.028) 0.1629 (0.0575) 0.0794 (0.0736) 0.1667 (0.0364)
Child benefits included 0.228 (0.040) 0.122 (0.029) 0.2099 (0.0597) 0.0493 (0.0579) 0.1126 (0.0400)
Gross earnings 0.134 (0.051) 0.048 (0.044) 	0.0325 (0.0904) 0.0828 (0.0779) 0.0609 (0.0631)
Gross earnings  t 0.004 (0.004) 0.002 (0.001) 0.0441 (0.0305) 0.0085 (0.0264) 0.0185 (0.0180)
Industry:
Mining and quarrying 0.272 (0.055) 0.046 (0.055) 0.202 (0.129) 0.061 (0.078) 	0.206 (0.111)
Construction 0.132 (0.052) 0.130 (0.042) 	0.0001 (0.123) 0.200 (0.071) 	0.001 (0.059)
Wholesale and retail trade 	0.054 (0.059) 0.119 (0.044) — 0.180 (0.097) 	0.014 (0.061)
Public admin., education, and health 0.083 (0.047) 0.055 (0.053) 0.129 (0.113) — —
Finance, ins., and real estate 0.083 (0.053) 0.095 (0.055) 0.188 (0.167) 0.103 (0.095) 	0.252 (0.137)
Transport & telecommunications 0.090 (0.063) 0.025 (0.041) 0.118 (0.123) 0.211 (0.098) 0.058 (0.087)
Manufacturing—Food, Textile 	0.002 (0.044) 0.025 (0.041) 0.009 (0.116) 0.026 (0.063) 	0.037 (0.059)
Manufacturing—machinery 	0.017 (0.049) 0.087 (0.048) 0.128 (0.130) 0.114 (0.071) 0.026 (0.072)
Not known 0.068 (0.131) 0.182 (0.099) 0.030 (0.148) 0.091 (0.130) 0.136 (0.149)
Constant 8.063 (0.084) 7.959 (0.078) 7.719 (0.151) 7.864 (0.138) (8.148) (0.078)
Adj R2 0.172 0.296 0.344 0.339 0.27
No. of obs. 1285 2107 483 413 1045
Base  junior high school graduates working outside Prague in agriculture, earnings net of tax and child benefits. Standard errors in parentheses.
RETURNS TO HUMAN CAPITAL IN COMMUNISM AND TRANSITION 123
